Pro patria limits to military obedience and soldierly honor in modern continental Europe; case studies from Polish and German military history by Tkaczyk, Robert A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2007-03
Pro patria limits to military obedience and soldierly
honor in modern continental Europe; case studies
from Polish and German military history
Tkaczyk, Robert A.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
PRO PATRIA: LIMITS TO MILITARY OBEDIENCE AND 
SOLDIERLY HONOR IN MODERN CONTINENTAL 








 Thesis Advisor:   Donald Abenheim 
 Co-Advisor Zachary Shore 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2007 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. Title and Subtitle Pro Patria: Limits to Military Obedience and Soldierly 
Honor in Modern Continental Europe: Case Studies from Polish and German 
Military History 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Robert Tkaczyk 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The present study analyzes cases when, officers considered themselves relieved of their duty as soldiers in 
favor of adhering either to what they believed was a higher loyalty and professional purposes or to their own personal 
interpretation of such values as honor, obedience, responsibility, discipline, integrity, and political neutrality.  
What are the limits of obedience for a military officer? The soldiers of Poland and Germany have served their 
nation and various regimes in modern history. The changes in those regimes have not been without effect on the 
professional self-images of those professional officers. How can the ideals of national loyalty and loyalty to individual 
conscience in the face of an unjust regime be reconciled with the dictates of democratic civil military relations and with 
the need to anchor the soldier in a constitutional system?  Can one, at the same time, from a different political 
perspective, be both a hero and a traitor? What are the similarities and differences between the moral aspects of being 
an officer along with an officer’s professionalism in the more narrow perspective of early and mid-20th century?  
The present study treats the matter of soldierly loyalty, military command and obedience and the transition 
from totalitarian to democratic rule in central Europe in the 20th century as such affects especially soldiers in the state. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
95 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Poland, Germany, WWII, Cold War, Military Obedience and Loyalty 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500                                                                                                                         Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
                                                                                                                                                               Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
PRO PATRIA: LIMITS TO MILITARY OBEDIENCE AND SOLDIERLY 
HONOR IN MODERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE: CASE STUDIES FROM 
POLISH AND GERMAN MILITARY HISTORY 
 
Robert A. Tkaczyk 
Captain, Polish Army 
 B.S., Polish Military Academy, 1997 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 



























Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The present study analyzes cases when, officers considered 
themselves relieved of their duty as soldiers in favor of adhering either to 
what they believed was a higher loyalty and professional purposes or to their 
own personal interpretation of such values as honor, obedience, 
responsibility, discipline, integrity, and political neutrality.  
What are the limits of obedience for a military officer? The soldiers of 
Poland and Germany have served their nation and various regimes in modern 
history. The changes in those regimes have not been without effect on the 
professional self-images of those professional officers. How can the ideals of 
national loyalty and loyalty to individual conscience in the face of an unjust 
regime be reconciled with the dictates of democratic civil military relations and 
with the need to anchor the soldier in a constitutional system?  Can one, at 
the same time, from a different political perspective, be both a hero and a 
traitor? What are the similarities and differences between the moral aspects 
of being an officer along with an officer’s professionalism in the more narrow 
perspective of early and mid-20th century?  
The present study treats the matter of soldierly loyalty, military 
command and obedience and the transition from totalitarian to democratic 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
II. PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM ....................................... 7 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM ..................... 7 
B. THE PROFESSIONAL NATURE OF THE MILITARY ....................... 15 
1.  Expertise................................................................................. 15 
2. Responsibility ........................................................................ 17 
3.  Corporatism ........................................................................... 18 
C. OFFICER QUALITIES AND MILITARY VALUES: MOST 
VITAL TRAITS ................................................................................... 20 
1. Code of Honor........................................................................ 20 
2. Political Neutrality ................................................................. 23 
3. Obedience, Loyalty, and Discipline...................................... 24 
4. Integrity .................................................................................. 26 
D. MILITARY ETHICS ............................................................................ 27 
III. PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS................ 31 
A. CIVILIAN SUPREMACY OVER ARMED FORCES ........................... 31 
1. Subjective Civilian Control ................................................... 33 
2. Objective Civilian Control ..................................................... 34 
3. Clausewitz and Civil-Military Relations ............................... 35 
B. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS ............................................................ 37 
C.  CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN 
SUPREMACY OVER ARMED FORCES ........................................... 42 
IV. HEROISM, BETRAYAL AND SOLDIERLY EXAMPLE IN 
CONTEMPORARY CENTRAL EUROPEAN CIVIL MILITARY 
HISTORY ...................................................................................................... 47 
A. HANS OSTER.................................................................................... 49 
B. COL. CLAUS VON STAUFFENBERG .............................................. 55 
C. COL. RYSZARD KUKLIŃSKI ............................................................ 61 
V.  CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 67 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 77 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................................................. 83 
 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my thesis advisors Professor Donald Abenheim 
and Professor Zachary Shore for their priceless help and assistance in 
completing this thesis. 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
The present study treats the matter of soldierly loyalty, military command 
and obedience and the transition from totalitarian to democratic rule in central 
Europe in the 20th century as such affects especially soldiers in the state. 
Throughout modern European history, national armies have typically been 
established by kings, princes, and parliaments. In this connection, military honor 
and professional loyalty have therefore been the foremost qualities required of a 
military officer first to the dynasty and later to the nation state. Such loyalty is 
supposed to be unconditional so long as such loyalty is based upon the rule of 
law. It is one of the fundamental functions of an armed force that its soldiers be 
loyal to their nation, their commanders, and their comrades in arms. One of the 
functions of patriotism and nationalism at arms has been to demonstrate, often 
through elaborate ceremony, the close connection of military officers’ 
professional honor  with citizenship and deference to the nation-state. However, 
historically, such loyalty has not always proven to be unconditional, especially in 
the era of the great wars of nations, such as the two World Wars and the Cold 
War. But characterizing loyalty as “equivocal” would be a contradiction in terms. 
Nonetheless, a study of the soldier and the state in central Europe reveals 
notable instances when a nation’s concepts of loyalty, honor, and discipline were 
misinterpreted or violated by an unscrupulous regime or individual. In certain 
instances, officers considered themselves relieved of their duty as soldiers in 
favor of adhering either to what they believed was a higher loyalty and 
professional purposes or to their own personal interpretation of such values as 
honor, obedience, responsibility, discipline, integrity, and political neutrality.1 
The present study analyzes such cases, making use, thereby, of the 
record of the past from the early 19th century until the 1990s. Among such 
soldiers, there were certain Prussian officers who were dissatisfied with the 
                                            
1 Hans Ernest Fried, The Guilt of the German Army (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1942), 235–38. 
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Franco-Prussian treaty and upon the outbreak of the Russian war in 1812, joined 
the service of their country’s nominal enemy, Russia. Carl von Clausewitz, whose 
book, On War, became the masterpiece which influenced generations of soldiers, 
statesmen, and scholars, changed sides after Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow.2 
“Three hundred Prussian officers – almost a fourth of the officer corps – 
submitted their resignations in disgust; and among those who now left the king’s 
service were numbered Boyen and Clausewitz.”3 From the 17th century onward, 
the dynastic soldierly principles of the Prussian Army had been based on a 
concept of strict patriotic fervor to the sovereign and court, a fervor that 
recognized devotion only to the greater glory of Prussia and the army itself and a 
loyalty that transcended all other oaths of allegiance to the king and estate. Thus 
Clausewitz’s statement after the Franco-Prussian treaty is remarkable: “I believe, 
I must confess, that the shameful blot of a cowardly capitulation is never wiped 
away; that this drop of poison in the blood of a people is transmitted to posterity 
and will cripple and undermine the energy of later generations.”4 Clausewitz’s 
ideal of service to Prussia and Germany at large embraced a patriotic calling for 
the officer beyond the dynastic bond to the sovereign, and looked forward to the 
soldier of the nation. In this case, to the German nation as it rose up against 
Napoleon in the era of the wars of liberation.   
The question of obedience and its limits in the soldier’s code of honor 
became more acute in the age of total war and the ideological conflicts that lay at 
the foundation of this era.  Both World War II and the Cold War provide further 
notable examples of the limits some officers placed on unquestioning and 
unconditional obedience and the crises of conscience they faced in maintaining 
their military professionalism in the midst of. Claus von Stauffenberg and Hans 
                                            
2 Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1955), 59. 
3 Ibid., 58. 
4 Otto Hintze, Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk (7. Aufl., Berlin, 1916), 467, quoted in Gordon 
A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), 
58.  
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Oster are only two of the many German officers in WW II who acted against their 
superior officers and national leaders in adherence to their own convictions. 
Finally and the case that is the center piece of this study, in the 1970s, Col. 
Ryszard Kuklinski, a Polish officer, demonstrated his opposition to the ruling 
communist regime when he delivered classified documents to the CIA. 
The transition from communism to a democratic system in central and 
eastern Europe in the last two decades has raised issues of military 
professionalism amid the democratic attempt to master the totalitarian past of the 
soldier. And the legacy of the past cries out for analysis and policy 
transformations as such apply to new democracies. The changes in regime in 
Poland in the late 1980s and other central European countries necessitate a 
reorientation of the principles of exemplary soldierly honor and service on a more 
pluralistic foundation. As a member of an enlarged NATO, Poland must now 
study the examples of its neighbors and former opponents concerning such 
widespread issues of political purpose as ethics, soldierly honor, and the 
negative effects of national and world politics on military institutions.5 This 
thesis’s comparison of various national case studies may provide soldiers with 
the means better to understand their political and social worlds, and to orient 
themselves within an open debate about the past that is typical of European 
society at its best. In this context, for example, an officer or soldier might ask 
such questions of themselves, their superiors and of society as the following:  
What makes one a hero or a traitor? Does the officer’s profession demand 
more than any other profession due to patriotism? What are the main and real 
reasons to pardon Col Kukliński for spying, and to glorify Hitler’s traitors?6 The 
argument for this study is that there are some fundamental ethical values which 
should not be affected by time, and also that after 1989, influential forces in  
 
 
                                            
5 Marek A. Cichocki, Porwanie Europy (Krakow: Osrodek Mysli Politycznej, 2004), 31. 
6 Radek Sikorski, “Pride of Poland,” National Review, Vol. 56, April 19, 2004. 
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domestic politics established elites with strong Atlantic views, which led to critical 
change within the Polish strategic community and changed the image of an 
officer in Polish civil military relations. 
The wide range of literature covering concepts of a modern military 
serving a democratic society does not evaluate theory in the light of real events.  
None of the authors provide the answer to the main question this thesis 
addresses. 
Considering the principles of military professionalism and civil-military 
relations, is it ever possible to excuse disloyalty or treason? 
All the officers named above, Oster, Stauffenberg, and Kuklinski, and 
many others violated their oath as military officers and acted against the system 
they had vowed to serve. It is those situations and their example that evoked this 
question, the question that underlies this thesis as concerns the valid heritage of 
such figures as a source of tradition for modern central European soldiers as well 
as a reflection of the limits of the obedience more generally in the shadow of 
totalitarianism and its memory. 
Following this introduction, the thesis chapters are organized as follows. 
Chapter II covers the principles of military professionalism, emphasizes the 
supremacy of politics and policy, and illustrates how the military is used as a tool 
and an instrument of power and force by the government and political leaders. 
Chapter III focuses on the principles of democratic civil-military relations and the 
present difficulties involved in the civilian control of the military especially as 
these apply to central and eastern Europe. It discusses the standards of military 
professionalism for officers and the principles of civil-military relations. Chapter IV 
presents examples of historical cases in which military officers believed it was 
their professional and moral duty to act in defiance of their government’s political 




In the present era of democratic change, when control over the military is 
a fundamental aspect of civil-military relations, there should be no potential for 
dilemmas based on questions of obedience or a divided loyalty. Professional 
soldiers must have a clear understanding of their duties and responsibilities at all 
times and in all circumstances. Yet in the midst of the present conflict, in which 
the lines of soldierly calling are blurred with those of internal security as well as  
the requirements of irregular combat (i.e., civil military fusion) the urgency of 
these questions is more intense. Those duties and responsibilities are 
summarized in Chapter V, the thesis conclusion. 
 6
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II. PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM  
A military’s primary goal is to serve the nation-state and its ideals and to 
maintain a citizen-soldier way-of-life with the highest standards. The fundamental 
characteristics of army professionalism are a focus on service, expert knowledge, 
a unique culture, and a professional military ethos amid a political world that is 
chaotic as well as wider society marked by constant change and upheaval. 
Professional soldiers are self-disciplined, fully trained, and highly motivated, 
ready to sacrifice their life for their homeland and the security of its citizenry and 
to serve a coherent political purpose of national and alliance strategy. They strive 
to achieve a high level of professionalism through patriotism and an institutional 
culture that consolidates soldiers into cohesive units with high esprit de corps. 
“Army professionals voluntarily limit certain privileges and rights to competently 
practice the art and science of warfare. Challenge and selfless service are part of 
the contract – a soldier serving the Nation.”7  
The concept of army professionalization from the feudal basis of arms as it 
existed at the end of the medieval period, that is, as it originated at the turn of the 
fifteenth century, caused significant changes in the composition of armies, in 
military techniques, and military organization with implications for the subject at 
hand. The basis of military service was no longer religious duty, but financial 
gain.8 For instance, the armies of the northern Italian city states employed such 
soldiers of fortune because of their financial power and limits of men. The early 
model of a professional army was not perfect, however. Most soldiers recruited 
were not disciplined who in their savage condition showed a natural warlike spirit. 
But their moral codes, traditions, discipline, and customs differed radically from 
                                            
7 The Army Field Manual I (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2001), 14. 
8 Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), 15. 
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those that the knights of feudalism had represented. Besides, as the Florentine 
statesman and philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli pointed out, the condottieri were 
untrustworthy, unreliable, and caused a limitation of sovereignty. In reaction to 
the condottieri, he came up with the idea of creating a conscript army: an army 
composed of a state’s citizens who would fight willingly and enthusiastically for 
the state.9  
By the 17th century the most significant characteristics of this new military 
were discipline – a discipline based on a hierarchical chain of command – and 
constant drill and training to improve the army’s military skills. The army’s training 
under Maurice of Orange, for instance, despite its inclusion of mercenaries, was 
based on a system of values in which the relationship between the soldiers and 
the state was based on obedience and loyalty.10  
At the beginning of the 17th century, many European states implemented 
military reforms and changes championed in theory by Machivelli and put into 
effect by Maurice of Orange. The period was characterized by large-scale military 
campaigns, which led to a strengthening of the state’s authority. The French 
army, for example, was reorganized and put under dynastic civilian control and 
administration. The most significant military reform of the period was the 
introduction of a definite military hierarchy and division of power among the ranks 
which created a new unity of command.11 In addition, the implementation of a 
combat uniform and equipment standardization increased the sense of discipline 
and general morale.12  
While technology had a major impact on the development of the army, 
other factors molded seventeenth-century warfare. The first issue to be 
addressed comprised the soldier training methods. New methods were needed to 
                                            
9 Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, 20. 
10 Hans Delbrück, The Dawn of Modern Warfare (London: University of Nebraska Press, 
1990), 158. 
11 Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, 67. 
12 MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-
2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 53. 
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enable soldiers to maintain their self-discipline and the ability to overcome 
tactical weaknesses on the battlefield. Altering and improving troop behavior 
required infantry training, an emphasis on obedience, and especially military drill, 
key elements in the achievement of a high level of military skills and discipline.13  
During this period of absolutist states, the French model was one of the 
most popular military examples in Europe. However, by the middle of the 
eighteenth century, Prussia had become perhaps the outstanding military power 
in the region. King Frederick the Great paid great attention to the development of 
military professionalism, with an emphasis on obedience and faithfulness to 
orders. To achieve this goal, he wanted the Prussian nobility, whom he 
considered the mainstay of Prussian honor, to play the main role in the army as 
officers.14 In their efforts to achieve the highest standards of training, Frederic 
and his officers attached great importance to military drill on the model of the so 
called Lineartaktik, which they believed was essential to the physical and 
psychological control and forbearance that the battle culture demanded. 
Moreover, he wanted his troops to be more afraid of their officers than of the 
dangers they faced on the battlefield. He believed that the army reflected the 
dynastic state based on the estates. So, in the age of Frederic, Prussia was 
famous for its drills, which were executed with great precision.15   
By the end of the eighteenth century, the era of the old Prussian regime 
began to draw to a close in the face of the rise of new social groups and the 
impact of the revolution on European society. The military suffered from new 
constraints that stemmed mainly from the lack of motivation of the individual 
soldier. But there were a number of other organizational deficiencies as well, 
such as a lack of appropriate staff and logistics support, that made the old regime 
warfare profoundly indecisive. In addition, the current troops were very expensive 
to maintain, and many in the government complained that the state’s military 
                                            
13 Knox and Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, 47. 
14 Ibid., 50. 
15 Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy, 99. 
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expenses exceeded the gains achieved. And the sociopolitical and economic 
constraints were perceived by the Western states’ citizenry as aspects of the 
social inequality.16  
In France, especially, new values and ideologies of the Enlightenment 
were endorsed that swept across the nation and ultimately led to the French 
Revolution, which had a major impact on the development of the military 
profession. First of all, ordinary people began to identify themselves with the 
state’s interest in the “common good.” And they began to unite against not only 
internal, but also external threats posed by other European states that were 
unfriendly to the revolutionary new ideas in Europe. Eventually, revolution and 
war became identified as one and the same thing. And the young Rèpublique 
proved up to the challenge, achieving great military success and strengthening 
its position both within the European arena and internationally.  
The military power of France at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
was almost entirely due to Napoleon Bonaparte whose genius introduced many 
changes in the military arts as well as in society at large. Napoleon’s huge armies 
and highly efficient organizational system enabled campaigns to extend across 
huge distances and thus to conquer more and more European states. He was 
also able to achieve this goal because the French national army consisted of 
citizen soldiers who were willing to die in defense of their national values.17 
Moreover, in contrast to the army of Prussia’s Frederic II, Napoleon’s army 
included a new generation of officers who did not necessarily come from the 
higher social stratum and whose careers had originated with the French 
revolution. Though they were mostly young and inexperienced, a few battles 
turned them into efficient, self-reliant military leaders.  
As a result of the Napoleonic hegemony in Europe at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the French model of a modern national state influenced most 
                                            
16 Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy, 156. 
17 Delbrück, Dawn of Modern Warfare, 426. 
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countries to adopt new institutions and judicial standards and laws that were 
innovative at the time.18 Moreover, the twin ideas of “the nation” and 
“nationalism” arose in countries that had been defeated by the French army. This 
trend, especially, was evident after 1806 in German-speaking states and lands, 
where French hegemony was absolute. In Prussia, the ideas of a cadre of 
reformers gave rise to a new type of thinking officer (i.e., careers open to talent 
versus the ties of dynastic blood) as well as a staff system that would be capable 
of responding to the new challenges. The system of education for these officers 
involved new operational methods and tactics designed to make the Prussian 
army equal or superior to its enemy in movement, flexibility, inventiveness, and 
fighting power. The system was designed also to produce a new type of military 
leader who, thanks to his acquired military knowledge, would be able to work 
more effectively.19 
These revolutionary changes were also seen in European armies that 
became nationalized but, unlike the French, did not depend on having superior 
numbers. Thus, the entire nineteenth century was characterized by the significant 
development, modernization, and professionalization of Europe’s armies.20 The 
key element of these strong new armies was the new self-disciplined citizen-
soldier, who was well educated and strongly committed to the idea that military 
service is the very essence of citizenship itself. Because of economic constraints, 
there was a decided preference for the quality of troops, rather a quantity of 
troops. In any case, in addition to the active forces, there were also several 
thousand soldiers in reserve who could be swiftly mobilized.21 
In the late 1850s, when Helmut von Moltke became chief of staff of the 
Prussian army, the merger of professionalization on the 19th century pattern, 
                                            
18 Knox and Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, 71. 
19 Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1955), 38. 
20 Knox and Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, 92. 
21 Ibid., 94. 
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mass politics, and the imperative of machine warfare in the age of classes 
emerged. The implications of all of this for the subject at hand are fulsome. First, 
the reformers argued that amateurs should no longer command on the modern 
battlefield. They demanded a full-time commitment from officers who, they said, 
should have a good command of basic military knowledge and demonstrate 
courage, initiative, and enthusiasm within their military service. One of Moltke’s 
more innovative moves was to introduce the use of railroads for the large-scale 
transport of men and equipment.22 As a result of the application of modern 
technology such as the needle gun and the railroad by competent personnel and 
the use of new, more effective tactics, in 1871, Prussia achieved its ultimate goal: 
the unification of all German lands under Prussia’s auspices. Its political and 
military successes – most notably, winning its war with France in 1870 – made 
the new Germany and Great Britain by the end of the nineteenth century the two 
most powerful states in Europe.23  
In Europe, the impact of these two national revolutions and the concept of 
nation-states caused enormous sociopolitical and economic changes, changes 
that were driven by a nationalist spirit and that affected every aspect of people’s 
lives. The most important of these was education which was now oriented toward 
the restoration of national values and the cultivation of a sense of solidarity with 
the nation state. The widespread integration of this nationalistic education 
created a new generation of citizens that was focused on duty, striving, and hard 
work, all in the name “das Vaterland.” But now this idea was conceived not in 
dynastic terms and that of subjects, but of citizens and nations. To them, the 
fatherland was not just their village or province, but the whole country; and as 




                                            
22 Knox and Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, 104. 
23 Ibid., 123. 
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promote the principle of discipline and prepare every child to become a good 
soldier and good citizen, every aspect of German education was subordinated to 
the concept of military service.24  
Undoubtedly, the Great War of 1914–19 greatly reinforced this image of a 
modern military professionalism by its use of more and more sophisticated 
technology and demonstration of new strategies and tactics. The advent of the 
age of total war in the machine age in the dimension of social mobilization on an 
unprecedented scale also had troubling implications for the ideal of the 
professional soldier and the question of obedience and the rule of law. Notably, it 
was a three-dimensional conflict, in which each and every factor of the battle was 
crucially important. New command systems, intelligence forces, and 
organizational planning were introduced at both the tactical and the operational 
level. The introduction of tanks, planes, and submarines initiated the creation of 
new elite groups among the soldiers, changing the schemata of the battlefield 
forever and further radicalizing the face of war that had long ago left behind its 
dynastic framework of battle for an extreme of the Gesamtschlacht.25   
Unlike the French during World War II, the Germans had a decentralized 
command-and-control system that derived from the Prussian institutions of 
leadership in the face of war’s frictional elements. This ability to learn from the 
past, combined with realistic experimentation, enabled the Germans to achieve 
many successes in that war. The level of professionalism in the German armed 
forces spread throughout and influence the people on an unprecedented scale. 
The ideology of fascism, communicated through a highly organized and 
dedicated National Socialist propaganda machine, strengthened the bonds 
between the citizenry and the state and created an unprecedented willingness to 
sacrifice their lives in the name of the nation-state.26 However, the rise of 
                                            
24 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 304. 
25 Knox and Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050,. 
26 Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 
161. 
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totalitarian ideologies out of the crucible of war also annihilated traditional ideals 
of soldierly obedience and made the citizen in uniform of the total imperialist 
nation state a major theme for the inquiry contained here.    
The advent after World War II of nuclear weapons and the Cold War 
between Western and Eastern countries introduced a frightening new idea, the 
possibility of a mutually assured destruction. It was as if the genius of human 
invention had added the final dimension of doom to ideas born in the late 19th 
century that had made ideologies weapons of mass destruction even before 
science had perfected the fission kiloton weapon in the middle of the century. 
During this period, while many conflicts occurred around the world, all of them 
were carried out by conventional forces and at a level well under that of general 
war as had been the case in 1914-1945. After fifty years, the era of the Cold War 
ended, but very soon new challenges appeared on the horizon. Today’s military 
professionals, both leaders and ordinary soldiers, supported by the twentieth-
century’s digital revolution and the strategies of network centric warfare, must be 
prepared to fight global terrorism. Much of the current training strategies 
emphasize the soldiers’ development of individual combat skills and abilities 
through the application of the principles of leadership. In a realistic tactical 
environment, under mental and physical stress, they must be able to act 
effectively as small-unit leaders.  
Throughout history, such factors as technology, changes in society, 
politics, and individual skills, have all played a role in an evolving revolution of the 
military profession. At the same time, however, some underlying values, 
unaffected by the passage of time were as important to medieval knights as they 
are to today’s officers. Such values as obedience and loyalty, have survived till 
today and they are still the most important characteristics of the modern officer. 
Except for the few examples when violation of these values was excused, 
obedience and loyalty are the fundamentals which should be always fully 
respected by militaries. However, there could be situations when the violation of 
such principles is vital for the military success, but even then it is an exception 
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rather than a rule. Therefore all military personnel, especially officers due to their 
command function, must know that disobedience, disloyalty and treason are the 
worst crimes a soldier can commit. They must also know that only in an extreme, 
as it was in the case of anti-Nazis conspirators, treachery can be excused. 
Fabian von Schlabrendorff, a conspirator who was tortured by the Gestapo, said: 
“Obedience is the rule. However, there are cases which demand disobedience. 
This has been uncontested in the Prussian Army. Blind obedience has its origin 
with Hitler.”27  
The works of such scholars who specialize in civil-military relations, Carl 
von Clausewitz, Samuel Finer, Morris Janowitz, Samuel Huntington, and more 
recently, Elliot Cohen, have many similar aspects but sometimes different 
approaches to the professional nature of the military. Nonetheless, most agree 
that values such as obedience, loyalty, responsibility, and discipline are the most 
important and necessary skills for the military professional. Without these skills 
an armed forces cannot simply exist.  
B. THE PROFESSIONAL NATURE OF THE MILITARY 
1.  Expertise 
According to the U.S. scholar Samuel Huntington, one of the 
characteristics of all specialists, including military officers, is expertise. Thus, a 
person who is well educated and experienced, with specialized knowledge in 
particular areas of his chosen field, is considered an “expert.” In many fields, the 
standards of expertise are universal, regardless of time and location.  
Military professionals, therefore, are people who specialize in the art and 
practice of security, defense, military affairs and conflict itself. And armed conflict, 
given its changing nature throughout history, has come to require new, diverse, 
and increasingly sophisticated skills certain of which are unique to soldiers and 
others of which are shared by various professions. Technological advances, 
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especially – nuclear weapons, aircraft, computers, etc. – require members of 
today’s military to have extremely exacting training, selection, and education and 
to satisfy strict promotion procedures.28 Military officers comprise a great variety 
of specialists equivalent to those in civilian life, such as engineers, doctors, pilots, 
and many others exist. But armed combat itself is a unique function of the military 
profession. Military officers are responsible for organizing, equipping, and training 
the fighting force; planning activities; and directing operations both in and out of 
combat.29 It is their responsibility for commanding and controlling those involved 
in the official state application of violence as an exceptional skill, that separates 
military officers from other professionals. Military doctors and technicians, who 
are not trained to manage violence, for example, belong to the administrative 
branch of the officer corps, not its war-fighting branch. “A military specialist is an 
officer who is peculiarly expert at directing the application of violence under 
certain prescribed conditions.”30 As an officer becomes more experienced and 
rises in the ranks, he will be required to direct and command increasingly 
complex operations involving activities on a larger and larger scale. Thus, a 
brigade commander, for instance, is expected to function at a higher professional 
level than a platoon leader.  
Throughout history, the management and application of organized 
violence has always required specialized training, specific skills, and experience. 
Even knights and footsoldiers in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries 
and beyond were trained in the use of weapons – sword, lance, battleaxe, and 
eventually, guns, etc. – both on horseback and on foot. Today, that is still the 
case and, as in the past, in the continuing development of the art of warfare, only 
highly trained military personnel can rise to the level of officers. Nonetheless, 
during a war, less well trained civilians may replace officers for a short period of 
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time or at a low level of command. Indeed, during World War II, civilians, after 
only a brief training, were often promoted to officer rank and sent into combat. 
But they began at a relatively low level and only after gaining experience became 
professional officers. Thus, in a time of war, an unprofessional layman may 
become a professional military officer relatively quickly as compared to 
peacetime. Nonetheless, contemporary combat requires higher competence and 
technical ability from its leaders. In addition to their higher rank, competence and 
a gentle manner are often what makes officers not only effective leaders, but also 
well respected by the soldiers they command. The slogan “We salute the bars 
not the man” expresses well enlisted men’s attitude toward a commander who is 
incompetent or needlessly overbearing and brutal in his command.  
2. Responsibility 
The expertise of the professional military officer also entails a special 
social responsibility. Most professions are regulated more or less by the state, 
but the military profession is usually regulated in every respect by the state, 
whether totalitarian or democratic. An officer’s primary responsibility is to protect 
and defend the security of the state and its citizenry. While citizens have a vested 
interest in the safety of their state, only the officer corps is responsible for military 
security. In many countries, military behavior is regulated by precise customs, 
traditions, and rules which require that an officer’s skills be used only for 
purposes approved by his superiors and the state he serves. The officer must not 
employ his skills for personal benefit or personal beliefs.31 This obligation is the 
officer’s defense against any temptation to mistreat subordinates, to act against 
his superiors, or to betray his comrades.32 Col.Kuklinski, a Polish officer who was 
spying for the CIA, undoubtedly violated this important value, and did so  
 
                                            
31 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 17. 
32 Wolfgang Royl, “Military Acting in the Spirit of Moral Obligation,” in Civil-Military Aspects of 
Military Ethics: Military Leadership and Responsibility in the Postmodern Age, eds., Edwin R. 
Micewski and Dietmar Pfarr (Vienna: National Defense Academy Printing Office, 2005), 70.  
 18
differently than did anti-Nazis conspirators, was acting alone and could not be 
sure about his decision. Moreover, he did not even try to recruit or convince other 
officers to join him.   
An officer’s obligation is to obey the legal orders of his immediate superior 
and win battles.  He is also responsible to the ordinary citizens of his state who 
are likely to suffer for his failures. Since Germany between 1933-1945 was an 
illegal and immoral state, thereby Hitler’s orders became unlawful, anti-Nazi 
conspirators were recognized after 1945, and excused for disobedience and 
treachery. Poland between 1945-1989 has never been acknowledged as an 
illegal state, and therefore any military disobedience against the communist 
system the Polish armed forces were supposed to serve must not be glorified 
although it has already been excused for political purposes.  
The military officer is answerable downward as well, to the soldiers he 
commands. He is obliged to minimize the risks of his subordinates, to fight 
carefully and prudently, and to avoid wasting their lives by persisting in battles 
that cannot be won or seeking victories whose human costs outweigh their 
military value.33 In addition, military commanders are accountable for any war 
crimes committed by their subordinates, when the crime is perpetrated as a 
result of the commander’s order or without an order if the commander is fully 
aware of the crime.34  
3.  Corporatism 
Soldiers belong to a state-controlled and organized group that lives apart 
from the general society and they are required to be loyal to this organization. In  
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a democracy, this isolation may be limited but is seldom given up entirely. The 
process whereby the corporatism of the military is maintained consists of five 
important steps. 
First, the requirements for entry, especially for the military elite, must be 
clear and commonly known. High intellectual and moral standards are essential 
requirements in the recruiting and selection of future soldiers, especially officers. 
Second, the military education system must be sufficiently wide-ranging to 
enable officers to develop a well-grounded, cosmopolitan understanding of the 
world we live in. Military education, even at the lower levels, should not be limited 
to military skills alone. A program that combines general education with the 
science of modern warfare will provide the officer corps professional status in 
society and contribute to his social improvement. Third, the criteria for promotion 
of all military personnel must be based on objective standards, clear to all, and 
foremost, must be unbiased and fair. Favoritism of any kind undermines the 
effectiveness of every army.35 
“Fourth is the creation, education, and training of a professional military 
staff. The general staff in a democracy is a public, bureaucratized profession, an 
essential for a modern military to perform its duties.”36 Last, but surely not least, 
moral cohesion is vital for victory in war. “Esprit de corps,” as it is called, is a 
spirit of comradeship, enthusiasm, and devotion to a cause among the members 
of a group, usually military. It is the “feeling of camaraderie among members of a 
group or an organization: The campers have been together for only one week, 
but they are already bound by a strong esprit de corps,” which is French, 
meaning “group spirit.”37 A profession like the military, that is often associated 
with the threat of danger, demands a strong sense of solidarity. A military style of 
life requires group cohesion and professional loyalty, and needs to maintain the 
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martial spirit.38 Such moral cohesion is one of the most valuable elements of the 
group: it strengthens the cohesiveness and makes the members want the group 
to succeed.  
The anti-Nazi conspirators were strongly tied together by “Esprit de corps,” 
they had mutual purpose and a great belief in the rightness of their deeds, they 
also supported and secured each other, and very often they died together in the 
name of patriotism and freedom. Col. Kukliński was the only Polish officer who 
cooperated with the foreign agency, recognized as an enemy that time. He was 
not supported by any of his friends and he did not belong to any group or 
organization which could be recognized today.     
C. OFFICER QUALITIES AND MILITARY VALUES: MOST VITAL TRAITS 
1. Code of Honor 
The military code of honor is intended to define how an officer should 
behave in the routine and in the extreme that distinguish the life of a soldier. It is 
impossible of course to specify how soldiers should behave in all the possible 
different situations. It is especially difficult during combat because of the violence 
factor and the irreversible consequences involved in military action. Gentlemanly 
conduct, personal fealty, brotherhood, and the pursuit of glory are some of the 
historical and traditional components of military honor that have endured from the 
feudal concept of individual honor to the anchoring of same in the industrial age 
of national armies.39  
An officer, by definition, must be a gentleman or gentlewoman in his or her 
personal behavior. Although it is difficult to define such behavior, gentlemanly 
behavior, in the military sense, is based on tradition and the responsibilities of 
military leaders as derived from the feudal and absolutist system and adapted to 
the pluralistic present. It is the specific officer’s responsibility that requires him to 
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be a gentleman. Despite the fact that most armies today struggle with the 
problem of adapting the gentleman concept for a modern military, it has always 
been and still remains a vital component of military honor.40   
Personal allegiance, one of the elements of honor, has been adjusted to fit 
the military’s current bureaucratic organization on the basis of the nation.. Loyalty 
to a person became loyalty to a formal position. Military personnel, particularly 
officers, are obliged to be loyal to a person, as well as to an office. Anti-Nazi 
conspirators and Col Kukliński were supposed to be loyal to their military 
commanders and civilian leaders. Nevertheless they decided to break this 
fundamental element of honor and act against given orders. However, as 
mentioned before and is discussed later, based on historical knowledge, German 
conspirators were acting against a recognized evil and they were not alone in 
their fight. Col. Kukliński was acting completely alone, he could not be sure of the 
rightness of his choice and his deed, although excused, is still not fully 
recognized. 
Officers must pay personal fealty and allegiance to a civilian hierarchy. 
Brotherhood, or loyalty to comrades, is another indispensable aspect of military 
honor. It is basically a sense of loyalty to the soldiers of the unit. Because military 
organizations are complex, leadership requires strong group solidarity; the 
stronger it is, the greater the group’s effectiveness. As a matter of fact, 
Kukliński’s friends have never forgiven him that first and foremost he betrayed his 
comrades and brothers in arms, not a communist system. German conspirators, 
during the entire time of their struggle against the regime, belonged to the same 
group, and they remained loyal to each other until the bitter end. Brotherhood, 
actually, played a significant role in their way to free Germany from Hitler and his 
regime.      
Saluting, one of the most recognizable outward signs of the military, may 
seem a strange element to include as an aspect of military solidarity. Civilians, 
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especially, may misunderstand the significance of this recognition of those of 
higher rank. It is both a means of identification and a welcoming sign between 
members of the military family.41  
At first glance, the pursuit of glory seems a natural part of war. Indeed, 
some high-ranking generals even today claim that war is a good thing. In the 
past, when war seemed to be omnipresent, glory was invariably associated with 
the art of war as well as the imperative of feudal service or dynastic honor among 
one’s noble peers. Today, the military’s sense of honor also often involves 
seeking glory, but it does not necessarily have to be achieved in war.  
Before 1939, German conspirators, for instance, tried to avoid war, that is 
why they informed Great Britain about Hitler’s plans, and once the war began, 
they tried to bring about its end as early as possible to save many lives and make 
it possible for Germany to negotiate the end of the war. However, it is still not 
clear what Col. Kukliński could have achieved by spying for the CIA. Based on 
historical knowledge, it is doubtful that he could have saved Poland, which in the 
case of nuclear war between Russia and America would have been the centre of 
main nuclear impact and the U.S., thanks to Kukliński’s  reports, would have had 
precise plans of Polish defense systems and partial plans of Soviet defense 
systems. 
Because today’s military is not, strictly speaking, only a combat 
organization,  it is also a hierarchical and bureaucratic institution with a wide 
range of responsibilities connected with combat as well as those of any large 
public enterprise. Therefore, as officers know very well, glory can be attained in 
many other ways than war. Undoubtedly, there is still some risk that a leader or 
armed group may attempt to go to war despite the costs simply for the personal 
or national glory of it all. But no democracy should ever promote war for the sole 
reason of individual or collective glory divorced from some coherent political 
purpose. Nonetheless, as we all know, the twenty-first century has begun with 
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military violence that seems to have no end in sight. The pursuit of glory then, is 
still a strong element of military honor, that is wrongly involved in the pursuit of 
armed conflict.  
2. Political Neutrality 
“The professional soldier is above politics in domestic affairs. In totalitarian 
or authoritarian societies, it means that the soldier is obliged to the status quo.”42 
In a democracy, active soldiers of any rank must avoid the trap of partisan 
politics while nonetheless making use of their rights as citizens. The military in a 
democracy, exists to protect the nation and the freedom of its people.43 
Collectively, it does not represent or support a particular political view or ethnic or 
social group. Its loyalty is to the broader ideals of the nation, to the rule of law, 
and to the principle of democracy itself. Military figures may, of course, 
participate in the political life of their country just like any other citizen, but only as 
individual voters. Soldiers must be retired from military service before joining a 
political party, so that the armed services as a whole will remain separate from 
politics. The military as a government institution is a neutral servant of the state 
and the guardian of society.44 
Especially today, in democratic Poland it is extremely important for military 
officers to understand the significance of political neutrality. Although Col. 
Kukliński did not serve in a democracy, his example can blur and complicate an 
understanding of this important issue. Today Polish officers must not consider 
that if Kukliński was allowed to act alone against the communists, so they too can 
also question political decisions. It is especially important now when Poland 
actively participates in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
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3. Obedience, Loyalty, and Discipline 
Since the military organization is hierarchical, officers at each level within 
it must be able to command unhesitatingly and have the loyalty and obedience of 
subordinate units. Without its hierarchical structure, military professionalism 
would be impossible; indeed, the military would probably not successfully 
continue to exist. This is why obedience, loyalty to comrades, and discipline are 
the highest military virtues. “When the military man receives a legal order from an 
authorized superior, he does not argue, he does not hesitate, he does not 
substitute his own views; he obeys instantly.”45 It is not only out of bounds for a 
soldier to have his own opinion about a specific call to action, it is unprofessional. 
“Only when boldness rebels against obedience, when it defiantly ignores an 
expressed command, must it be treated as a dangerous offense; then it must be 
prevented, not for its innate qualities, but because an order has been disobeyed, 
and in war obedience is of cardinal importance.”46 For it is the profession of the 
soldier to follow orders as they come through a chain of command. Regardless of 
what the soldier himself may feel or think is ethical or morally right, he must obey 
orders This is necessary if the military system is to function properly. 
Military discipline, however, is justified largely because of its combat 
importance. An exaggerated use of discipline in the field during combat can do 
more harm than good. Thus every commander should know that discipline and 
training during peacetime will serve efficiency in combat. Officers should be 
taught the necessary fundamentals so that as commanders they do not focus on 
the unimportant. Eventually, every military officer should become a sort of 
psychologist.47 Like any other system, for the military system to operate  
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effectively, its various components must cooperate as expected to reach the 
desired outcome. If any element of the system deviates from the intended, it may 
spoil the outcome. Hence, the necessity by all involved for subordination.   
Insubordination could inadvertently sabotage a mission.  While people 
generally are free to have their own opinions and to voice them, this is not what a 
soldier is supposed to do. “In wartime and in many situations in peacetime, you 
cannot take the time to explain your decision. You must say, briefly and even 
abruptly: Go there. Do that. Now carry out my orders. Any reasonable man in a 
subordinate position will recognize the pressure of events and unhesitatingly do 
as he is told.”48 Undoubtedly, if there is time to explain, though he is under no 
obligation, the commander may do so, stating his reasons briefly, and then giving 
the order. But what if a subordinate is aware of circumstances that would prevent 
the achievement of the military goal and that only through disobeying the orders, 
will the goal be reached. In that case, disobeying may be justified, because the 
military goal and completion of the task have priority over the commander’s right 
to have orders obeyed. While this is seldom the case, during battle anything can 
happen and then there will be always be such a dilemma. Obviously, there is no 
unambiguous answer to the question of whether disobedience is ever justified. 
As mentioned examples of military disobedience show, it is extremely difficult to 
judge those who betrayed the system and people who they were supposed to 
serve and protect, without clear historical knowledge. Therefore as long as any 
case of disobedience is not clear, it cannot be fully justified and especially cannot 
serve as an example of good soldiering.      
After World War II, the international Law Commission, instigated by the 
UN, defined seven principles that govern the acts of individuals in war. One 
principle is that a person’s acting on the orders of his government or a superior 
does not relieve him of responsibility under international law. As a result, an 
oppressive question could affect a combat soldier at any moment: “Is, in fact, a 
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moral choice open to him in a given situation? Such an approach to military 
ethics and to the issue of legitimacy leads the way to commitment as a mode of 
military compliance and a source of combat motivation. Where mere obedience 
to government or superior does not relieve the combatant from his own 
responsibility, the only alternative is personal commitment.”49  
 Nevertheless, in most cases, soldiers must assume the greater 
competence and knowledge of their superiors and obey orders. For the same 
reason, the wisdom of the overall policy must be accepted as correct and cannot 
be discussed. While high-ranking officers can and should voice their opinions, 
especially when they disagree with a political decision about using armed force, 
they cannot directly oppose the policy and must follow the orders of the civilian 
leadership, making the best of a bad situation. There have been times, however, 
looking back at history, that it may have been a heroic act to resist authority 
within the military. Under Hitler, for example, subordinates' resistance to the 
abusive and sadistic orders of some of those in power would certainly have been 
heroic. Some German officers who joined the resistance to Hitler in the late 
1930s did violate their oath to follow the orders of the Fuehrer and Reichskanzler 
who was also the supreme commander of the armed forces. The situation was 
different during and at the end of the WWII, when in addition to the genocide 
Hitler had ordered, he gave absurd military orders in an ever increasing spiral of 
disaster. In such circumstances, disobedience would not only be justified, but 
also glorified.50  
4. Integrity      
Success in any activity, but particularly in combat, depends on mutual 
trust and group cohesion. Hence, integrity rates high in the military value system. 
The soldier in combat is always supported by bonds to his comrades, mutual 
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dependence, and trust. Patriotism and the main military purpose are not 
irrelevant, but his obligation to the nation is more distant and abstract than 
dedication to his comrades-in-arms.51 These interpersonal ties are similar to and 
as strong as – in fact, often stronger than – family ties in civilian life, because 
once a soldier is in battle, the only family he has and can rely on are his closest 
fellows, his comrades in arms. This solidarity usually takes precedence over 
barriers such as social class, race, and religion. The best example and proof for 
this is the solidarity of the contemporary world against terrorism, or in the past 
against Nazism. Nothing is more important than integration when one faces 
misery and adversity.  
Although such ties expand spontaneously, their formation comes from 
sharing the same worries and hopes, from the necessity for teamwork, from their 
by common experience and loyalty to one another, and from the mutual pride in 
their unit, and from just being a soldier. At the same time, the bonds between 
them are constantly being tested by the sudden, unexpected, and unavoidable 
situations that military units inevitably find themselves in.52  
In the late 1970s in Poland there was an organization called Solidarity 
(registered in November 1980) which was openly opposed to communists, but 
Col. Kukliński was not a member, he operated alone instead. As a matter of fact, 
he did not even warn Solidarity about Marshal Law plans, but he informed the 
CIA instead.    
D. MILITARY ETHICS 
Soldiers’ moral obligation to their nation, military, superiors, comrades, 
and troops is mandatory for all soldiers regardless of rank. It prevents officers 
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from bullying subordinates and both commanders and individual soldiers from 
endangering their comrades on the battlefield for selfish personal motives.53  
Claus von Stauffenberg, Hans Oster, and the others who plotted to 
assassinate Hitler are now considered heroes, which raises two key questions. 
Are there any fundamental principles of war that are not affected by the passage 
of time? Or does everything depend on different points of view that derive from a 
given context of politics and society at a given time? Is Col. Ryszard Kukliński 
who spied for the CIA during the Cold War similar to the German officers? Are 
people who consider him “the first Polish officer in NATO” right or wrong? Only a 
sense of duty that comes from personal beliefs can answer questions about the 
legitimacy of a person’s actions. 
As long as the military is an organization in which obedience is an 
important value, there will be conflict at times, however, between ethics and the 
military’s professional activities. Every commander is aware that discipline and 
authority are intended to guarantee an immediate execution of a given order. But 
no member of the armed forces, but especially officers, can be expected to follow 
orders, especially ethically nebulous orders, without understanding them. That is 
why commanders must build a supportive and cooperative atmosphere within 
their units, effectively and promptly handle difficulties among subordinates, 
educate and teach them, and be able to explain problematic issues and orders. 
From an ethical point of view, every commander should strive to be just and set 
an example to be followed. As it was mentioned earlier, it is very important that 
soldiers trust their commander’s competence and believe in the accuracy of his 
decisions. Authority alone is not sufficient to assure an order’s execution. 
Respect and an ethical attitude are also most desirable. Only the recognition of 
value, honor, and dignity along with moral qualities such as tact and tolerance, 
self-control and discipline, patience and responsiveness can ensure respect,  
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understanding, and sympathy, the essence of contemporary leadership. Respect, 
acquired by moral qualities, shapes the ground for authority. Authority gained by 
force or formal position will not be fully reliable.54  
Because the military profession is the only institutionalized profession that 
deals with life and death, it must be fully moral and operate according to strict 
ethical rules. The legitimacy of war and the legitimacy of soldiers’ conduct in war 
comprise the central issue of military ethics. A soldier’s perception and 
interpretation of legitimacy is at times the ultimate test of his honesty, loyalty, and 
moral integrity.55 
Theorists distinguish between the rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 
The rules of jus ad bellum pertain to the circumstances under which states can 
acceptably wage war, while the rules of jus in bello serve as guidelines for 
fighting fairly once war has begun.56 
“In regard to the first question, there are conditions that make the use of 
force legal. The most important criteria are: a) war must be declared by a lawful 
authority; b) there must be a just cause; c) war must be prosecuted for rightful 
intention; d) war must be a last resort; e) there must be reasonable hope for 
success; f) the political objectives must be proportional to the cost of war; g) war 
must be publicly declared. There are basically two criteria for just in bello: a) war 
must be fought justly; b) discrimination must be observed (in the sense of 
noncombatant immunity).”57   
Those conditions cover only the most predictable aspects of a war, since 
many of the consequences of war are unforeseeable and incalculable. Although 
authority, cause, and intention, can be used to test the legitimacy of war, it is not 
that easy and simple. “Each one of these criteria faces serious difficulties, both 
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logical and epistemological. Going deeply into ethical question causes more 
uncertainty than transparency. For example, who decides what is a legitimate 
authority?  Who decides what are just causes? Who decides whether the 
intentions are right or not? The answers to these questions are always 
subjective.”58 
Questions about legitimacy in war face the same difficulties. For example, 
if a legitimate war is one that does not harm the innocent, then who are the 
innocent? And, finally, who decides when a soldier can follow his conscience and 
disobey orders? Were the German officers who opposed Hitler right or wrong? 
The officers’ professional duty to obey the leaders of the state clashed 
irreconcilably with the state’s legal and moral responsibilities.  
In next chapters, we address such ethical dilemmas and possible answers 
in more detail. 
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III. PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
A. CIVILIAN SUPREMACY OVER ARMED FORCES 
When faced with a potential war situation, countries naturally look to their 
military, for that is the purpose for which armed forces are created. In a 
democratic society, people elect a leader whom they trust will make the 
appropriate decisions with respect to the nation’s security. This leader is 
expected to demonstrate competent leadership in regard to the issues of war. A 
democratic military has the job of carrying out decisions made by duly elected 
leaders, because the military’s job overall is to serve the nation and its society. 
Because the major decisions in a democratic country are made by elected 
officials, the citizenry’s control of the military and other institutions is indirect as 
befits a republic.59 According to a U.S. government document titled “Principles of 
Democracy: Civil-Military Relations,” “there are some basic ideas concerning 
civil-military relations which are fundamental for democratic society: 
• Civilians should take an active role in the decision making process 
concerning war and peace as well as national security. Ultimately, 
civilian leaders represent the whole society and are responsible for 
any military decisions; 
• The people of a democratic country decide to have a military 
component for a reason. This reason is to protect the society. 
Therefore, the military is not an organization with a political or 
social bias; its primary mission is to protect the nation and serves to 
carry out decisions that the people make. The military implements 
what is decided by the elected civilians 
• Active-duty soldiers may vote, just like any other citizen, but this is 
as far as it can go. Politics needs to stay separate from the armed 
service; that is why every soldier has to retire if he wishes to 
become a politician.  
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• Civilians, who represent the whole democratic society and make 
decisions about national security issues, must promote democracy 
and value freedom. Military subordination exists to carry out orders 
made by the elected leaders. Because of the inherent separation of 
military and politics, this leaves civilians with the duty to manage 
and oversee the military which requires an educated, 
knowledgeable civilian.”60 
Civilian control over the military, the elementary principle of civil-military 
relations, is at the same time one of the fundamentals of democracy. A 
democratic society relies on its military, and the armed forces, although politically 
neutral, are inseparable from society. 
Samuel E. Finer argues that the military is actually unable to rule the state; 
that is why civilian control over the armed forces is natural.61 “Even in those 
states commonly described as military dictatorships, the ruling body, junta, or 
cabinet, will be found not to consist exclusively of military men.”62 The more 
sophisticated the country, the more complicated it can become to manage. In a 
simple economy, it may be relatively easy for the military to control the state. 
However, it can be quite complicated in a more developed economy. “The more 
primitive the economy, the easier it is for the armed forces to administer it by 
purely military men and measures. Modern armies are a microcosm of the state; 
they possess their own separate and self-contained system of provisioning, 
supply, engineering, communications, even of education. As societies become 
more complicated, however, so do the technical skills of the armed forces lag 
further and further behind them.”63  
Thus, in advanced states, society depends on the military in terms of 
security, but the military needs society in terms of economic advances. It is a  
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simple mutual need. What is more, since the army is a microcosm of the state, 
officers cannot refuse to obey civilian orders and then expect subordinates to 
follow their orders.  
Although Samuel Huntington wrote his book The Soldier and the State fifty 
years ago, it continues to influence scholars around the world. Some of his ideas 
must be adjusted to allow for new perspectives, but many remain applicable as 
originally stated. For example, his concept of two major types of civilian control 
over the military is still valid: there are two major types of civilian control, 
subjective and objective.64  
1. Subjective Civilian Control  
Subjective civilian control maximizes the civilian power and automatically 
minimizes the military power relative to civilian control. However, because the 
civilian population of is so large and inherently diverse, it is difficult to maximize 
civilian power as a whole. So the maximizing of civilian control refers, in effect, to 
either one civilian group specifically or civilian groups. Usually, one civilian group 
gains power at the expense of other groups.65 Historically, a certain social class 
will typically gain power through subjective civilian control. Although subjective 
control ensures efficient civilian power over the military, at the same time, it 
makes a particular group of people much more powerful than the others, which 
blurs the distinction between the military and civilians. In other words, subjective 
control, by promoting a single political party, is a danger in a democracy.  
This state of affairs is exactly what happened in Germany before World 
War II, for example. In 1933, a circle of figures around President Paul von 
Hindenburg, at pains to break the deadlock in parliament and willing to scrap 
democracy paved the way for Hitler to be named Chancellor.66 The Germans, 
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who were dissatisfied with the Treaty of Versailles and the resulting economic 
depression in their country, needed strong leadership.67 Thus Hitler, with his 
strong belief that Germany could recover its past greatness and his unusual 
ability to address and influence the masses, was in the right place at the right 
time. Over a few months in 1933, the National Socialists coordinated the civil and 
political institutions to create a one-party dictatorship with the aid of soldiers. And 
eventually, terror, conspiracy, surveillance, and force became the means by 
which the civilians controlled the armed forces as well as infiltration of the ranks 
of the military with party members as well as enthusiastic support of Nazi aims.68  
In general, if one steps back from the German case for an instant, once 
national militaries became more professional and the role of officers more of a 
profession, the competition among civilian groups to control the military became 
more complicated. And civilian groups began to compete with each other over 
the agenda of military institutions. The professionalization of militaries actually 
changed the notion of civilian control, and it became much more meaningful than 
it had been before the rise of the military profession.69  
2. Objective Civilian Control  
Objective civilian control occurs when a military attains the respect and 
honor associated with professionalism and power is divided between civilian 
groups and the military. This type of civilian control provides for a more 
professional military and promotes democracy.70 Thus the two types of civilian 
control, objective and subjective, are exact opposites. Subjective control causes 
the military to become a microcosm of the larger society in which it exists. 
Objective control uses the military to serve the society which created the armed  
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service for its own protection. It is not surprising, then, that the push for 
subjective control typically comes from various civilian groups, while the push for 
objective control comes from the military.71   
Subjective civilian control blurs the boundary between civil and military, 
undermining the professionalism of soldiers. Objective civilian control, by keeping 
the military out of politics, helps to promote the professional status. It prevents 
the military from playing favorites among the various civilian groups. To further 
promote and maintain the respectability of the profession, therefore, the military 
must be politically sterile.72  
3. Clausewitz and Civil-Military Relations            
This chapter’s discussion of civilian control and civilian supremacy would 
be gravely incomplete without some mention of Clausewitz’s timeless 
contribution to civil-military relations via his theory of war at the end of the 
dynastic age and the rise of the wars of nations. Although his masterpiece, On 
War, refers mainly to politics during wartime, it is also extremely important to the 
theory of the military in politics in general. Clausewitz defines inseparability 
between the military and politics and their mutual relationship. “This unity lies in 
the concept that war is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no sense 
autonomous. It is, of course, well-known that the only source of war is politics – 
the intercourse of governments and peoples; but it is apt to be assumed that war 
suspends that intercourse and replaces it by the wholly different condition, ruled 
by no law but its own. We maintain, on the contrary that war is simply a 
continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.”73 By 
saying this, he clearly determines that the political or the deeds of policy 
dominate military considerations.  
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Nevertheless, the question of the proper level of political control over 
military operations, which is crucially important, has no easy answer. The 
conventional theory of civil-military relations, which originated with Sun Tzu in the 
fourth century BC and is still noted today, says that wartime decisions may be 
political in the beginning, but the course of war should be in the hands of military 
professionals.74 Such an idea is also echoed in the strategic precepts of Helmuth 
von Moltke. There are as many historical examples that support this theory as 
there are those in conflict with it.  
In the book Supreme Command, for example, Eliot Cohen argues that 
politicians should not stay out of the military during war, because when politicians 
are not managing the military, a major disaster may result. This was once 
summarized nicely by French Premier Georges Clemenceau: “War is too 
important to be left to generals.”75  
Cohen explains that war is not only something that needs to be managed 
politically, but also that it needs to be political in all aspects, including all the 
components of war management. Those generally include aspects such as 
gaining and managing allies, isolating rivals, and utilizing resources. According to 
Cohen, it is the people’s job to determine what in war society can accept or 
decline when military professionals have varying opinions about how certain 
situations should be handled. Cohen points out that it is important for politicians 
to manage war and to become involved in it, regardless of the outcome.76   
However, currently, his ideas contradict a significant percentage of American 
opinion concerning U.S. involvement in the war in Iraq. “A more relevant 
assessment is that peace is too vital to be left to pundits and members of 
Congress – people who have overwhelmingly dismissed the option of swiftly 
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withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq.”77 Although there is no doubt that war and 
politics are inseparable and that the military must be controlled by civilians, there 
is no answer to the question as to how deeply politicians should be involved in an 
armed conflict.   
Nevertheless, the examples of the Nazis’ regime in Germany and Martial 
Law in Poland show clearly what happens when the military intervenes in politics.  
That is why, today it must be clear, that the military should stay out of politics, 
and that it is not a military’s role to decide about national politics.    
B. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS 
The government’s job is to ensure a strong political, economic, and ethical 
structure for maintaining national security. The military has the responsibility to 
decide which strategies, methods of implementation, and specific tactics will 
enable a desirable outcome with the least amount of loss.78 If the civilian 
leadership formulates goals that the military perceives as impossible to achieve, 
it can put a lot of stress on the military and cause friction between the military 
and civil authorities. That is why the civilian authorities should do everything in 
their power to strengthen military effectiveness, not decrease it.   
Military effectiveness is important in all nations. To reach maximum 
effectiveness, a military must have a sufficient strength force to complete any 
required task, but, at the same time, it must be sufficiently subordinate to do only 
what is required. In a democracy, there should be equilibrium between the 
civilian leadership and military effectiveness. At some level, the civilians must 
manage the issues involving the use of power and force and the rivalry between 
democracy and expertise. In most countries, the government has the 
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responsibility to deal with issues whose outcome will determine the effectiveness 
of the armed forces. Most national militaries have the potential to become 
increasingly more effective without compromising their civilian control. Civilian 
control is necessary for military effectiveness especially in terms of any mission 
that attempts to achieve political ends by using military means. In general, this is 
becoming an increasingly difficult task as the roles and missions of national 
militaries become increasingly varied and more numerous.79 Thus the various 
institutions – ministries of defense, legislatures, intelligence agencies, military 
budget offices, recruitment systems, and military educational facilities – that 
determine civil-military relations must work diligently to maintain the military’s 
effectiveness and to keep full control over the armed forces.80 
In most countries, the legislative institutions have an integral role in 
controlling the country’s military. In democratic states, those institutions, which 
are fundamental to a democratic society, are usually made up of elected 
representatives and play a key role in controlling military policy, oversight, and 
budgets. Thus, democracies have to balance their legislative and executive 
branches of government in the formation of policies. Indeed, most such 
legislatures participate not only in civilian control of the military, but also in the 
development of defense policy.81 
There is wide-spread agreement that the legislature’s role in matters of 
defense in a democracy helps to ensure not only accountability, but also the 
transparency of the policies formed. And the accountability component is 
strengthened even more if representatives of both the legislative and the 
executive branch are involved in the policymaking. The society in general is also 
better served when there is input from all segments, not just the executive 
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branch. Defense issue debates conducted by the legislature help to educate the 
public, and the resulting policies will likely be more well rounded and longer 
lasting than policies simply dictated by the executive branch. The oversight that 
the legislature provides helps to ensure that policies and laws are also properly 
implemented and reveals possible policy flaws that must be remedied. The fact 
that the legislative branch is publicly involved reduces the chance that the military 
will fail to comply with its regulatory responsibilities.82   
The more power the legislature has in overseeing the defense sector, the 
stronger the opportunity for civilian control. Because countries structure their 
legislatures according to their own various and unique needs, there is still much 
to be learned about legislative institutions’ involvement in military affairs.83 But 
one thing is certain: a good relationship between civilians and the military is 
crucial to national security. A ministry of defense (MOD) is a government 
institution that helps ensure quality cooperation between the civilian and military 
leadership. Successful democratic civil-military relations require a strong, 
influential defense ministry or department that truly deserves to be called the 
“guardian of the guardians.”84  
A ministry of defense serves many significant purposes, which generally 
include: structuring a balance-of-power relationship between the elected officials 
and the military; stating and giving responsibility to both civilian and military 
officers; maximizing the effectiveness of the military; ensuring the maximal use of 
resources such as funds, equipment, and soldiers.85 When civilians control the 
military, one problem that may occur is an attempt to control improperly the 
intelligence services. Democracy requires the transparency that is fundamental 
to democratic governance. Nevertheless, intelligence services often need the 
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exact opposite to operate effectively.86 By nature, military intelligence services 
need to be secretive, which compromises some of their accountability and 
transparency. Civilians must be able to work inside the military intelligence 
community to balance the power a specific military branch may have. Although it 
may create tension between the civilians and the military, this is one of the major 
ways that a democracy can be strengthened democracy and maintain its civilian 
supremacy.87 
Another aspect that affects a military’s effectiveness is the defense 
budget. The amount of money that a country allocates for its defense budget will 
determine the amount and nature of the resources also allocated. Many countries 
have a relatively weak way of managing their finances, and, in some cases, 
civilians have no involvement in or responsibility for providing for national 
security. In other countries, the civilian elites have included defense spending as 
part of their overall campaigns for fiscal reform. Yet, in some states the defense 
budget is determined not by need, but by the money that is available. In these 
cases, national security is sidelined so that the government can focus on other 
fiscal criteria. It is only after the budget is finalized that the military is able to 
decide how to spend the few funds allotted it. Thus, the defense experts are 
given no opportunity to contribute to the decision-making process concerning the 
monies needed for national security, and there is a break-down in the civil-
military relations. This is why there is a strong need for military advice and civilian 
professionals who recognize the need for military input in regard to the budget.88   
The way that civilians join or are drafted into the military varies from 
country to country. Recruitment may include several different systems, all which 
affect civil-military relations in the long-term. The system of recruitment also 
influences the way the society perceives the military. Thus the recruitment 
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process is vital to civil-military relations because it has an immediate impact on 
the connection between the individual citizen and the national defense system. 
The practice of having a national armed force is almost universal. However, the 
way they are created differs from country to country and changes over time in 
keeping with a country’s social, political, and economic changes.89   
Ultimately, each nation has to decide which type of recruitment process is 
best for its unique situation. Many countries in Europe and the United States 
have a history of compulsory military service. Military systems in many western- 
and eastern-European countries are still based on conscription. Compulsory 
military service versus an all-volunteer system has been the focus of debate 
worldwide. Since the era of mass armies went out with the Cold War, countries 
were forced to reevaluate how they will systematize recruitment. Democracies 
need to be aware of public scrutiny in regards to this issue. The end results of 
any recruitment decisions will require both political and military leaders to work 
together to ensure acceptance by society.90 
Education has, undoubtedly, crucial impact on the professional character 
of the military and its effectiveness. The most fundamental values such as 
responsibility, loyalty, and, foremost, obedience to political authority are forged in 
military minds through the wide field of education. The best way to educate 
soldiers, particularly officers is to show them the good examples of officers’ 
behavior and also examples which clearly indicate improper conduct. The 
examples of anti-Nazi conspirators are undoubtedly clear illustrations of when 
disobedience to military orders and political decision might be excused. 
Nevertheless, even with such a clear example, what must be stressed is always 
an exception, rather than rule. For the same reason, Col Kukliński’s  case cannot  
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serve as an illustration of when disloyalty can be excused. It is, as it was already 
mentioned, still too nebulous, and it could only raise more questions and doubts 
about military obedience and loyalty.  
Wars can be won in the classrooms, long before the armed forces are 
involved in conflict. Civilians placed in the same classrooms as military officers 
help to keep military scholars cooperative with liberal democracies without 
compromising military effectiveness.91  
Due to the fact that democratic military education’s fundamentals include a 
loyalty to civil society and respect for civilian leadership, it helps democracy and 
society as a whole. Military officers need to have an appreciation of the institution 
of democracy. In this dynamic world, the competitive edge is through education. 
A long term investment in the minds of the military pays off in the long run.92 
The most fundamental issue of civil-military relations, civilian supremacy 
over the armed forces, depends then on many factors as discussed above. To 
ensure full control and keep military effectiveness, all of them have to be 
engaged. Moreover, officers must understand and fully accept civilian 
supremacy, but civilians need to respect and always consider military experience 
and expertise when there is a country’s defense decision to be made.  
C.  CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN SUPREMACY 
OVER ARMED FORCES 
Although such countries as the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom have one 
of the longest histories with democracy and democratic control over the armed 
forces, they face new problems concerning control over the military. One issue 
which significantly undermines democratic control and democracy itself is related 
to the increasing number of private military firms operating around the globe. 
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Although this problem is not directly related to the topic of this thesis, it is critical 
to understand the importance of the civilian supremacy over the military and its 
meaningful role in democracy. 
For the last two centuries, the privatization process has touched 
everything but the military. As such, the military profession has been 
distinguished from all other jobs. “Society has a direct, continuing, and general 
interest in the employment of this skill for the enhancement of its own military 
security. While all professions are to some extent regulated by the state, the 
military profession is monopolized by the state.”93 Some problems with civilian 
control over the military are expressed by the increase in the privatization of 
security provisions. “More generally, the argument perhaps finds expression in 
the suggestion that, in present circumstances, states have a monopoly on the 
ability to legitimize violence, but they do not have the ability to monopolize 
violence.”94    
Hiring private firms to provide military training is not new whatsoever. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, British military companies operated in the Middle East and 
Africa, and U.S. companies trained Vietnamese forces. After the Cold War, 
however, the number of firms offering military services has increased; the scale 
of their operations has developed immensely.95 
Although private military firms (PMFs) have begun their activities with 
logistical support and military training, now they also provide clear combat 
support or sometimes conduct battles. On the one hand, PMF’s can be and are 
very useful. On the other hand, values such as loyalty, accountability, legitimacy 
and, foremost, oversight and control are endangered. PMFs can bypass 
democracy by handing foreign policy tasks over to companies which are not held 
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accountable. These PMFs may offer another way that an executive body can go 
about a secret operation while leaving out other military branches entirely. There 
is almost no authority over PMFs. Any operations conducted by these PMFs can 
therefore be kept secret from the public. Payments to PMFs can be made by 
funds coming from anywhere. Because of the lack of the clear paper trail, there 
may be poor legislative oversight which may adversely affect the balance of 
power, one of the very things democracy is based on. The use of PMFs may 
change the way that the military is viewed by the citizens of any democratic 
country. The military formally rely on upon membership and support and has not 
been viewed as a company working for its own monetary profit.96 
As far as principles of civil-military relations are concerned, particularly 
democratic control over the military, governments are meant to be accountable to 
the people. Current PMFs are overstepping their boundaries by taking over what 
has traditionally been the responsibility of the government, the UN or regional 
alliances. Soldiers in most national armies take oaths of allegiance to some entity 
representing national sovereignty. Private corporations are concerned with profit 
to themselves and also to their shareholders, not with allegiance to the 
government. There is a general lack of accountability inherent in hiring these 
PMFs. They actually have the potential to work for anyone, not just legal 
governments. This is why it can be very short sighted to use them. One cannot 
predict who will hire them in the future, they may even work for the enemy if the 
price is right. A potential client of these private corporations could include 
terrorists or other hostile groups.97  
In a military, there is always the risk of some sort of disloyalty, but it is 
nowhere nearly as high as the risk when using PMFs. Angry or disgruntled PMFs 
could actually retaliate against clients in many ways. If the client does not pay, or 
if there is an unwanted termination of contract there may be some severe 
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repercussions. Soldiers who work for money only will always be tempted when 
more money is involved. “Equally important is the fact that their motivation for 
fighting is economic gain; this ‘cash’ nexus is what distinguish a mercenary from 
a volunteer soldier.”98 
Except for the problems with legitimacy, control, oversight, loyalty, 
responsibility and accountability, private military firms can have a potential 
negative influence on the status of the local military and thus a potential 
disruption to civil military relations. “When private firms are contracted for military 
roles, usually at the decision of the civil government, it is often taken as a proof of 
the failure of the local military to carry out its own responsibilities properly.”99  
As long as there is a strong demand for private militaries, these firms will 
exist, but without any measure of regulation especially, when in a PMFs’ market 
there is a potential for corruption. One would need to analyze potential losses to 
see the overall outcome on society of using PMFs. Undoubtedly, there is a strong 
need to create new rules and regulations. Otherwise the democratization process 
which is being spread around the world will endanger its own principles.100 The 
following considers this body of theory levied against the actual experience of 
soldiers and politics in the most extreme circumstances of the age of total and 
cold war.   
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IV. HEROISM, BETRAYAL AND SOLDIERLY EXAMPLE IN 
CONTEMPORARY CENTRAL EUROPEAN CIVIL 
MILITARY HISTORY 
The soldier and politics considered herein underwent its perhaps greatest 
process of trial in the wake of the First World War. On June 28, 1919, after six 
months of negotiations, the peace treaty which officially ended World War I, was 
signed by the victors and vanquished. The Treaty of Versailles, named after the 
Palace of Versailles where the conference took place, was decisively opposed by 
the German people. Many Germans found themselves betrayed by their own 
government, which was believed to have approved conditions without a fight.101 
To make matters worse, Germany, after World War I, was in a great financial 
disaster of inflation, and according to Versailles, had to pay huge reparations to 
the allies. In addition, the representatives of the fledgling Weimar Republic were 
not allowed to take part in the peace talks. As a result of all these misfortunes, 
many Germans saw the revolution in Russia and communism as a solution to 
their problems. Riots, demonstration and strikes were organized by communists 
and constituted a real danger to the young democracy in Germany.102 In 
September 1919, a demobilized soldier, Adolf Hitler joined a small nationalist 
party called the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei. It had only a few members and no clear 
objectives, but its members nourished great hatred of the government. Relatively 
soon, Hitler with his unquestionable ability to address crowds, became the leader 
of the party and renamed it to Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei – 
NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers’ Party). The name Nazi stands for 
the first two letters taken from National and the third and fourth letters 
Sozialistische.103 
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In January 1923, due to Germany’s inability to pay reparations, France 
occupied Germany’s most important industrial region – the Ruhr. This caused a 
significant rise in inflation, which severely damaged the country, but at the same 
time, enabled Hitler and NSDAP to get more supporters. After an unsuccessful 
attempt to seize power in the late 1923, Hitler learned his lesson, and figured out 
that he could only do so legally. Help came again with the great depression in 
1929, when the German people, unhappy with poverty, unemployment and 
desperately looking for someone to improve their situation, turned to Hitler and 
the NSDAP. During the elections in July 1932, the NSDAP won 230 seats in the 
parliament, and became the largest party in Germany.104 Although the President 
of Germany, Paul von Hindenburg, was not fond of Hitler, describing him as an 
“Austrian corporal,” he appointed Hitler Chancellor in 1933. Purportedly, 
Hindenburg was influenced by his son Oskar to make Hitler Chancellor because 
he was afraid that Oskar would divulge that von Hindenburg had registered his 
property in East Prussia in the name of his son, to avoid paying taxes. 
On January 30, 1933, after the radio broadcast of Hitler’s appointment, 
thousands of Berliners shouted and sang “Heils” and “Hochs” and “Deutschland 
uber Alles,” cheered Hitler and Hindenburg. Of course, not every German 
supported the Nazis, but their opponents had already been stopped and for the 
next fifteen years the Nazis never lost power.105  One has to admit that Hitler, 
with his ideology and prejudices, mirrored, in some way, the thoughts of those of 
his time.106  
It was clear for Hitler that Hindenburg, who was already eighty six, would 
not live long. He died on August 2, 1934 and the last faint remnant of German 
democracy died with him. The same day Hitler announced his new oath of loyalty 
for the military:  
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I swear by Almighty God this sacred oath: 
I will render unconditional obedience to the Fuhrer of the German 
Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, Supreme Commander of the 
Wehrmacht, and, as a brave soldier, I will be ready to stake my life 
for this oath at any time.107 
After Hindenburg’s death, Adolf Hitler adopted the title, Fűhrer and 
Reichskanzer, to demonstrate dominance over any of his predecessors. He 
officially claimed that Hindenburg’s title Reichspresident should die with its 
previous owner. Hitler, strongly supported by Oskar von Hindenburg achieved his 
goal and became the ruler of the Reich. On August 18, Hindenburg’s son 
announced, in a radio broadcast, that ”my father saw in Adolf Hitler his direct 
successor as head of the German state, and I am acting in accordance with my 
father’s wishes when I call upon all German men and women to vote for the 
transfer of my father’s office to the Fhűrer and Chancellor.”108  
When Hitler came to power, he was commonly accepted by professional 
soldiers. The moment of disabuse came for many loyal officers with the Night of 
Long Knives, the massacre of hundreds of SA (the storm-troopers, paramilitary 
organization of the NSDAP that had assisted the Nazis rise to power in the 
twenties) leaders, Hitler’s purported rivals, on June 30, 1934.109  
One of Hitler’s earliest opponents was Hans Oster, a military officer who 
had served with distinction in World War I. After the SA massacre, Oster 
changed from skepticism about the regime into strong resistance. 
A. HANS OSTER 
Hans Oster was born in Dresden in 1887. He was a career officer who 
valued military order, obedience and loyalty. He served bravely during World War 
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I where he earned the Iron Cross First and Second Class and the Knight’s Cross 
with Swords. He stayed in the army after the war, and like most other 
professional soldiers, he was not fond of the Treaty of Versailles and Weimar 
Republic, though he served it loyally. He also obediently accepted Hitler when he 
came to power.110 
Oster was dismissed from active service at the beginning of 1933, when 
his affair with a senior officer’s wife was discovered. In October 1933, he was 
offered a job in the Abwehr, intelligence agency, that enabled him to stay in close 
contact with the secret state police – the Gestapo. At that time, his suspicions 
about the Nazi ideology significantly increased, but he remained loyal to the 
regime. The turning point in his ideas came with the massacre of hundreds of SA 
leaders on June 30, 1934. Oster joined the resistance and also involved his wife 
due to her English skills so she could translate BBC broadcasts. It was also he 
who, in late 1938, recruited Ludwig Beck who was Chief of Staff of the German 
armed forces and was extremely valuable for the resistance group. The Chief of 
the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, who was already involved also had tried to 
influence Beck, but did not succeed. Oster and Beck were passionate horse 
riders and Oster used that fact as an excuse for several excursions where they 
could talk undisturbed. Nevertheless, Beck’s sense of loyalty and dedication to 
Germany did not let him join the opposition before he retired from army service in 
1938.111 There were more people who worked loyally for the Reich and 
simultaneously were opposed to it, like the great general Guderian who did not 
support the Nazis whatsoever, but served loyally during World War II.112  
After Austria was annexed by the Reich in March 1938, Hitler’s popularity 
significantly increased. The victory, without any fight and no German troops 
killed, caused opponents to decrease. The society would have not understood a 
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coup against a leader who had done so much for Germany in such a short time. 
The Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, with 3.5 million German-speaking 
inhabitants, was Hitler’s next military target. Although the majority of people of 
Sudetenland were Czech and Slovak, Hitler claimed that all Germans should live 
inside the Reich, so he intended to annex this whole region. When Hans Oster 
and the other conspirators learned of Hitler’s plans, they began preparations for a 
coup. The plan was based on the assumption that France and Britain, as 
Czechoslovakia’s allies, would declare war. The resistance group informed 
British and French officials about Hitler’s plans, but were completely ignored. 
Also, many German army officers thought that an attack on Czechoslovakia 
could bring on war, and tried to dissuade Hitler from carrying out the plan. Hitler’s 
response to that warning was clear and firm. “I’m not asking my generals to 
understand my orders, but to obey them!”113  
Under the auspices of Hans Oster, plans for the coup were already 
prepared in detail which was to isolate the Reich Chancellery, with the support of 
a few armed officers, and then enter the building and capture Hitler. Among the 
resistance group there were two ideas about what to do with Hitler. Due to the 
unpredictability of the public’s reaction, some conspirators wanted the dictator to 
be publicly judged for his crimes; the others, like Oster, wanted him to be 
immediately killed. “As long as Hitler was alive, he argued, there would be a risk 
of forces loyal to him mobilizing to rescue him. He was a popular figure and it 
would be better to demonstrate to the nation what crimes he had in fact 
committed - but this should take place only after he was dead.”114 As a matter of 
fact, Oster gave a secret order to one of the members of the assault group to 
“accidentally” kill Hitler. The army was supposed to take control of the country in 
order to prevent anarchy. However, this required the involvement of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the army, Walter von Brauchitsch, who was not trusted, 
although he personally was opposed to Nazism. That is why the conspirators 
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were to involve him at the very last moment. The new Chief of Staff of the armed 
forces, Franz Halder, was not involved but was fully trusted by his predecessor 
Ludwig Beck, who had a high opinion of him. Erwin von Witzleben, Commander 
in Chief of the Army, and one of the conspirators, was responsible for the 
isolation of Berlin during the coup.115  
Meanwhile, the negotiations between Britain, France and the Reich over 
Czechoslovakia were in process. The declaration of war by Czechoslovakia’s 
allies was vital for justification of the coup. One has to keep in mind that 
regardless of Hitler’s previous military successes, German society was generally 
against a war, and the coup would have been presented as the only way to avoid 
armed conflict.116  
Although Czechoslovakia was backed up by the military treaties with 
France and Russia, international relations between the key countries were in 
favor of Hitler. Russia was to help only if France upheld its treaty obligations, and 
France was too weak militarily and politically to act without British support. British 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain admired Hitler in 1937 and in 1938 tried to 
keep peace at all cost. Except of the mobilization of the British Fleet and 
ultimatum issued to Germany, Chamberlain did not do much to save 
Czechoslovakia and continued his policy of appeasement. To make matters 
worse, in 1937, the U.S. passed the Neutrality Act. Above all, it was just twenty 
years after the Great War and terrible memories were still fresh.117   
As a result of international indifference, during the Munich conference in 
September 1938, the peaceful cession of Sudetenland was granted, and the 
resistance plan for a coup failed. What is more, Hitler raised the stakes and 
except for military occupation, made a demand for evacuation of all Czechs from 
the inhabited territory. Although mobilization of the British Fleet and fourteen 
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French divisions made Hitler hesitate, it did not stop him from execution of his 
plans. On October 10, 1938 Czechoslovakia lost Sudetenland and its mountain 
defenses. The coup failed and the resistance significantly weakened just hours 
before fulfillment. Hitler was more victorious than ever before and deepened his 
beliefs in his infallibility. His next target was Poland and the extermination of the 
Jews.118    
The failure of the 1938 conspiracy did not bring an end to the resistance, 
and Oster remained an active opponent to Nazism. However, his plans to destroy 
Hitler’s regime and save Germany had never been as close to fulfillment as in 
1938. Unfortunately, Germany was much better prepared for war than before, 
and the enthusiasm of the high ranking commanders for a coup decreased. 
Nevertheless, Oster tried to prevent total war until the invasion of Poland and 
never gave up during the war. The next plan to overthrow the Nazis occurred just 
after the defeat of the Poles. The key person in this new plot was general 
Hoepner – commander of a panzer army with Headquarters in Dusseldorf. “The 
plan was to keep two armored divisions of Hoepfner Gruppe in the vicinity of 
Berlin to use them to surround the Reich Chancellery on the day of issuance of 
orders for the Western Offensive, and to occupy strategic positions… in the rest 
of Germany.”119 Nonetheless, due to the unwillingness of the majority of high 
commanding officers to carry out the next plot, some of Oster’s group 
conspirators decided to kill the Fűhrer even with small support. Erich Kordt, a 
German diplomat who warned Britain about secret negotiations between 
Germany and Russia, decided to assassinate Hitler by himself. “All I need is a 
bomb, he told Oster. You will have the bomb by November 11, was the reply.”120 
Kordt, as a member of Ribbentrop’s entourage visited Hitler often enough to be 
trusted by personal guards, could easily bring and detonate the bomb close to 
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the Fűhrer. Despite Oster’s best effort, he could not obtain the necessary 
explosives. Also, security around Hitler strengthened, and the assassination 
plans failed once again.121  
Until the first serious German defeat at Stalingrad, where Oster’s son was 
killed in action, the conspirators did not have the opportunity to assassinate Hitler 
and seize power in the Reich. Another appropriate time came when fortunes of 
war turned against Hitler in February 1943. Oster and his friend from the Abwehr, 
Hans von Dohnanyi, planned to kill Hitler with the help of some officers of the 
Army Group Centre, at that time deep inside Russia. They planned to blow up 
the plane with the Fűhrer aboard, flying from the Russian front to his 
headquarters in East Prussia. Once it had happened, Oster accompanied by 
others was to seize control of Berlin. It is quite important to mention that after 
Poland’s defeat, the conspirators received assurance of help from Chamberlain, 
which was overdue, but still could be useful after the coup.122 Although, a bomb 
was successfully placed in the plane, it did not explode, probably because of low 
temperatures. In spite of the fact that an attack failed again, conspirators decided 
to fight against the Nazis to the bitter end. The same month, another 
assassination attempt organized by Oster’s group, failed when the fuhrer 
changed his plan to visit a military exhibit in Berlin and avoided the planned 
execution by a suicide bomber.123  
Hans Oster not only desperately tried to kill Hitler but also helped some 
Jews to escape in the beginning of 1943 to neutral Switzerland. He and 
Dohnanyi managed to deliver the funds and fake documents to fourteen Jews. 
Dohnanyi was arrested by the Gestapo, after financial the related fraud was 
discovered, and imprisoned in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Oster, 
was experienced enough to cover evidence but was captured when trying to hide 
and destroy proof of Dohnanyi’s illegal funds transfer. Oster was dismissed from 
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the Abwehr, which was entirely dissolved in February 1944, and put under house 
arrest. He, therefore, was unable to be involved in the July 20 plot to assassin 
Hitler.124   
After that unsuccessful attempt to kill Hitler, when a bomb placed by Claus 
von Stauffenberg only slightly wounded the Fűhrer, the Gestapo lunched a 
massive pursuit for all resisters. “Oster and between 160 to 180 other officers 
were arrested, tried, convicted, and hanged. In consequence, the war in Europe 
continued until May 8, 1945, hundreds of thousands were killed on each side 
during the last ten months of World War II, and Germany was devastated and 
occupied.”125   
After the war, Oster’s daughter recalled her father:   “My father was fully 
aware of what he was doing, his decisions were based on logic and ultimately on 
human considerations. Few people were in a better position to alter the course of 
events, and my father was a man of action. Once he had decided on a course of 
action he would stay on it. The risk of drawing the odium of treachery upon 
himself didn’t seem too high a price to pay.”126  
B. COL. CLAUS VON STAUFFENBERG 
Colonel Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg joined the resistance relatively 
late, but he gave a new, tremendous spur to further conspiracy developments. 
He was born in 1907 to an old Swabian Roman Catholic aristocratic family. He 
had two, three-year older twin brothers, Alexander and Berthold. The latter, who 
became a lawyer and served in the Navy during the war, was also involved in the 
resistance. Alexander, a historian, was never fully trusted by his brothers and 
was the only one who survived the war. Claus during his early years saw the rise 
of the Weimar Republic, which, as for many other German people, had no 
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attraction to him. Similarly to Oster, he had a great talent for music and drawing. 
His decision on a military career was a surprise for his family, not only because 
of his health problems, but because his natural talent and his own consideration 
of architecture as his further career. Stauffenberg married Nina von Lerchenfeld 
three years before he joined the military. The couple had five children, the 
youngest Konstanze was born after her father’s death. In 1926, Stauffenberg 
began his military career in the 17th Cavalry regiment stationed in Bamberg, 
Bavaria, Germany. In 1927, he was promoted to cadet sergeant and one year 
later went to the Hanover Cavalry School. After returning to Bamberg he was 
promoted to second lieutenant in 1930, and six years later attended General 
Staff training in Berlin.127 One year later, Stauffenberg wrote a prize-winning 
essay on defense against paratroopers and also an analysis of tank warfare. In 
1938, he, as Staff Officer joined the 1st Light Division commanded by General 
Erich Hoepner, who later was involved in Oster’s conspiracy and coup attempt.  
In October, the same year, Stauffenberg took part in the Sudetenland 
annexation, but did not know that his Division was supposed to participate in the 
planned coup. In September 1939, Captain Stauffenberg with the 1st light division 
occupied Poland and by that time he was proud of Germany’s victories. Although 
doubts had just begun coming to his mind, he served proudly and bravely on the 
Russian front in 1941. During this time, after he saw the atrocities perpetrated by 
the SS on the east front, and witnessed how Hitler limited supplies and 
reinforcements to the army, his reluctance to the Nazis increased. By the middle 
of 1942, he became convinced of the necessity to assassinate Hitler.128  
At the beginning of 1943, after being promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, 
Stauffenberg volunteered for the North African front and was sent to Tunisia as 
1st Staff Officer in a panzer division. He did not serve in Africa long, because he 
was badly wounded when under a British fighter attack. “He lost his right hand 
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and two fingers on his left hand. He was also blinded in his left eye and had 
wounds to his ears and knees.”129 Although severely injured, after six months, 
Stauffenberg returned to active duty. Regardless of his previous military 
achievements and loyal service, motivated by his sense of honor, Stauffenberg 
decided to join the resistance. In October 1943, he became Chief of Staff in the 
General Army Office commanded by Friedrich Olbricht. Hitler by that time, 
stubbornly and mindlessly, was throwing his last reserves into the fight. 
Stauffenberg immediately, together with other conspirators, including his brother 
Berthold, began planning to kill Hitler. In the light of Hitler’s absurd military 
orders, assassination was actually in harmony with his own book Mein Kampf. 
“Hitler had also written that to save a state from destruction, members of that 
state had every right to rid it of destructive leaders.”130  
There were three officers who volunteered to murder the dictator: Captain 
Axel Freiherr von dem Bussche, Ewald Heinrich von Kleist, and Eberhard von 
Breitenburch. Unfortunately, none of them succeeded. Bussche and Kleist, who 
came from the same regiment, were ordered to rejoin it few days before planned 
assassination. Breitenbuch, at the very last moment, was kept by SS guards from 
attending the meeting with Hitler, where he was to shoot the dictator.131  
On July, 1 1944, Stauffenberg was appointed as a Chief of Staff to 
General Fromm, head of the Reserve Army, which gave him direct access to 
Hitler. An operation plan for a coup, named “Valkyrie,” was supposed to activate 
the Reserve Army in Paris, Prague and Vienna and the conspirators to take 
control over the country in the name of national interest after Hitler had been 
killed. Operation “Valkyrie” which was originally created in case of a coup against 
the Nazi government was actually approved by Hitler. The dictator, in 1942, was 
convinced by General Olbricht, one of the conspirators, of the necessity of such a 
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plan and gave an order to formulate it.132 The plan which, originally, was 
supposed to help Hitler and the Nazis in a case of a coup, was to be used by 
conspirators to take over power in the Reich. After the Fűhrer’s successful 
assassination, the SS were to be blamed for the coup. Military and civil key 
persons in Berlin and others in main cities were selected and instructed about the 
coup. Radio broadcasts were already prepared and typed. The only conspirator 
who had relatively easy access to Hitler was Stauffenberg, so it became clear 
that he would have to assassinate the dictator and also lead the coup in Berlin. 
Time was running out because the Russians were on their way to Germany and 
the Allies were preparing for the invasion in France. It was already clear that 
Germany had lost the war. Nevertheless, Henning von Tresckow, general staff 
officer in the high command of the Army Group Centre, who recruited 
Stauffenberg (but at the time of coup was at the front), was fully convinced about 
the coup and advised Stauffenberg. “The assassination must take place. Even if 
it does not succeed, the Berlin action must go forward. The point now is not 
whether the coup has any practical purpose, but to prove to the world and before 
history that German Resistance is ready to stake its all. Compared to this, 
everything else is a side issue.”133    
The part of the plan was also to kill the Minister of the Interior, Heinrich 
Himmler, so that he could not assume control. In the meantime, the head of the 
Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, was dismissed and the entire Abwehr was 
taken under the control of Himmler. Conspirators had to speed up the execution 
of the plan because they knew that soon, all secret plans, and also evidence of 
Hitler’s committed atrocities which were kept in Canaris’ safe box, would be 
discovered. Stauffenberg decided to kill Hitler by detonating a bomb hidden in a 
briefcase. The first attempt took place on July 11, when Stauffenberg as a new 
commander of the Reserve Army, was call to Hitler’s headquarters in Bavaria. 
However, it did not succeed because Himmler was not present during the briefing 
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with the dictator and the assassination had to be postponed. On July 15, the 
attempt failed again when the conference with Hitler was finished earlier than it 
was planned. However, Operation Valkyrie had already been issued and the 
army stationed in Berlin was ready for the coup. When the operation was 
cancelled, conspirators managed to convince Wilhelm Keitel chief of the OKW 
(Armed Forces High Command) that the decision about the operation was made 
only to initiate a full rehearsal in case of real coup. The conspirators became very 
nervous about the situation because it was necessary to complete the task 
before allies defeated Germany, so there would be still a chance to negotiate the 
end of the war.134 
By that time, the group of officers who realized of denseness of 
continuation of the war increased. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, leader of the 
legendary Africa Korps, joined the conspirators and said of Hitler: “I know that 
man. He will neither resign nor kill himself. He will fight, without the last regard for 
the German people, until there isn’t a house left standing in Germany…I believe 
it is my duty to come to the rescue of Germany.”135 Although, there were some 
speculations about the real motives Rommel was driven by, he did not contribute 
to the resistance at all because he had been heavily wounded in an allied attack 
on his car.  
The next chance to eliminate Hitler came on July 20, when Stauffenberg 
was called to attend a conference at the Wolf’s Lair, Hitler’s headquarters in East 
Prussia. The orders concerning the plot had already been prepared to be issued 
once Hitler was dead. General Fritz Fellgiebel, conspirator and Chief of Signals 
of the OKW, was prepared to shut off the communication system in the Wolf’s 
Liar to prevent those loyal to Hitler from contacting the outside world. The 
Governor of occupied France, General Heinrich von Stulpnagel, was ready to 
arrest all Gestapo and SS officers.136 
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The plot was ready to be executed, and Stauffenberg knew that from that 
point, success depended only upon him. In the early morning of July 20, he flew 
to the dictator’s headquarters and just before 12:30 entered the conference room 
with a bomb hidden in a briefcase. Once the bomb was activated, Stauffenberg 
did not have much time because the fuse was set for ten minutes. Inside the 
conference room, after being introduced, the assassin put the suitcase under the 
Hitler’s table and left unnoticed. Once he heard the explosion, it was clear for him 
that Hitler was dead. Stauffenberg flew back to Berlin and, as a chief of the whole 
plot, began Operation Valkyrie. He did not know that Hitler was accidentally 
saved by Colonel Heinz Brandt who had moved the briefcase away from dictator 
to have closer access to the Fűhrer. Brandt did not survived, but Hitler was only 
slightly injured. Again, as a consequence of almost unbelievable coincidence, the 
dictator stayed alive. Nevertheless, the operation was already in process, 
communication with the Wolf’s Liar was cut off, and 1200 Gestapo and SS 
officers in Paris were arrested. Unfortunately, communication was restored after 
three hours and Hitler immediately informed his propaganda minister, Joseph 
Goebbels of what had happened. At 6:30 pm the same day, the German radio 
announced to whole Europe that there had been unsuccessful attempt to kill the 
fuhrer. Six hours later, Hitler personally announced to Germany that he was 
alive. “My German Comrades, If I speak to you it is first in order that you should 
hear my voice and should know that I am unhurt and well, and, secondly, that 
you should know of a crime unparalleled in German history… The bomb which 
was planted by Colonel von Stauffenberg, exploded two meters to the right of 
me…, but I am completely unhurt… I interpreted this as confirmation that 
Providence wishes me to continue my life’s mission as I have in the past.”137 
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Claus Philipp Maria Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg was sentenced to 
death for treason and executed by firing squad. Some other conspirators were 
given ability to shoot themselves or to take poison. Many others, following Hitler’s 
order, were hanged with wire attached to meat hooks. “I want them to be hanged, 
hung up like carcasses of meat.”138 
As a direct result of the July 20 plot, almost five thousand people were 
executed, and the resistance never recovered. Hitler stayed in power until May, 9 
1945, and another thousand people died.  
Although right after the war, the Oster and Stauffenberg cases were not 
clear enough to categorize them, today both men are recognized as the bravest 
men in German history, whose loyalty and highest devotion to their country is 
undisputable. 
C. COL. RYSZARD KUKLIŃSKI 
The rise of communist armies in Europe in the wake of the Second World 
War, amid the fifty years of the Cold War, included cases when officers, feeling 
the need to be relieved of the oath they had taken, regarded it as their duty to act 
against their commanders and the regime they currently served in favor of what 
time has suggested was a greater national cause. 
Col. Ryszard Kukliński, director of the operational-planning directorate of 
the Polish general staff in 1970s, who died in Florida on February 10, 2004, had 
one of the most dangerous and successful intelligence careers of the Cold 
War.139 
Kukliński was born on July 13, 1930 in Warsaw. Influenced by war and the 
patriotic conduct of Polish soldiers, he became an officer, and in 1951 began 
service in a mechanized regiment. His anger and hatred for the system he 
served appeared for the first time in 1956. He was deeply shocked by the 
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violently crushed, Polish uprising, when some seventy five workers died, and 
also, by the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising the same year. Right 
after the industrial unrest, high ranking Russians, among them Marshal 
Konstanty Rokossowski, were forced to leave Poland. That allowed Kukliński 
believe in the prospect of change. 
In 1963, Kukliński was graduated from General Staff Academy and 
appointed to a position in General Staff Headquarter in Warsaw where he worked 
on military exercises concerning strategic operations.140 Over the next nine years 
he prepared and took part in handling of the main strategic Polish and Warsaw 
Pact exercises that enabled him to have wide access to secret information. The 
Warsaw Pact strategy was offensive and assumed an attack on West Germany, 
Holland, Belgium, and Denmark. By that time, Kukliński’s intellectual friend was 
General Chocha, deputy chief of staff for operations and later Chief of General 
Staff, who, like himself, thought that Poland should not have an offensive 
strategy but be focused on self - defense. “Why was it an offensive strategy? 
Why were Polish troops attacking NATO? Shouldn’t they only defend Poland?”141 
In 1967, Kukliński was sent to Vietnam as a member of the International 
Control Commission, where he was believed to make contact with the CIA for the 
first time. As a matter of fact, there were many American troops and among them 
one with Polish roots. Although Kukliński spoke to him once, and tried to see him 
again, he never was able to do so.142   
After returning from Vietnam, his doubts and suspicious about real Soviet 
intentions increased significantly due to the Warsaw Pact intervention in 
Czechoslovakia to put down an uprising. On August 20, 1968, Polish troops 
along with Russian, Hungarian, Eastern German and Bulgarian troops crossed  
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Czechoslovakia’s border and, in cooperation with the Czech president, 
suppressed the revolution.143  After forty years, Czechs still remember Polish 
intervention. It will probably take a long time for full forgiveness.  
Another event which convinced Kukliński of the necessity to contact the 
Americans occurred in December 1970, when Polish troops were ordered to 
open fire at shipyard workers protesting food’s rising prices. Forty seven 
protesters were shot to death, and about a thousand were hospitalized.144 
Kukliński had to wait until August 1972, for a convenient time to contact the 
Americans, when he was authorized to lead a surveillance sailing trip along the 
western European coast up to Belgium. Once all the crew, consisting of eight 
officers and his son Bogdan, were harbored in West Germany, Kukliński 
managed to send a letter to the American military attaché in which he asked for 
the meeting. After a short phone conversation with the U.S. Embassy in the 
Hague on August, 17, in the late evening of the same day, Kukliński met two CIA 
agents.145  
For the next nine years, he delivered to the CIA over forty thousand pages 
of “secret plans of Soviet exercises for the invasion of Western Europe, the 
location of Soviet wartime command bunkers, plans for the imposition of martial 
law in Poland, and the details of numerous weapons. He gave successive U.S. 
administrations direct insight into the planning of Warsaw Pact militaries and his 
information became the standard by which other intelligence from behind the Iron 
Curtain was judged.”146      
Kukliński with his wife and two sons had to escape from Poland after it 
was found out that there was a leak in the Polish General Staff. Soon after, U.S. 
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President Ronald Reagan, at the beginning of 1981, ordered reports about 
Kukliński to be sent to the Vatican, it was discovered that there was a CIA agent 
on the Polish General Staff.147 Kukliński believed that there was an East German 
secret police (Stasi) agent operating in the Vatican, who became aware of his 
cooperation with U.S. intelligence. On November 7, 1981 the CIA transported 
Kukliński and his family to America.  Three years later, Col. Ryszard Kukliński 
was sentenced to death, in absentia, by a communist court in Poland; but, after 
the fall of communism it was changed to 25 years imprisonment and as a result 
of pressure from the U.S. concerning Polish membership in NATO, the sentence 
was annulled. Kukliński stayed with family in the U.S. until his death in 2004, but 
it was not a nice time for him whatsoever. In 1994 his younger son Bogdan 
disappeared while sailing in Florida and was never found. His other son, 
Waldemar, was hit by a car by an unknown man and died. It is believed, although 
there is no evidence, that it could have been the Soviet secret service’s revenge 
for his treason.148  
In 1998, after seventeen years in America, Kukliński visited democratic 
Poland, where even today, he has as many opponents as supporters. After he 
died his ashes were transported to Poland and rest in a cemetery in Warsaw.149  
Supporters claim that unquestionably Col. Ryszard Kukliński is a national 
hero and should be considered as the first Polish officer in NATO. They had 
already awarded him honorable citizenship of Krakow, one of the main cities in 
Poland, and want to promote him posthumously to General. People who strongly 
support him base their opinion on one general statement, that Kukliński, by 
working for the Americans, had indeed fought against communism and served 
the best national interest of Poland, endangering his family and his own life, and 
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only this one fact, is enough to consider him as a hero.  In other words, his 
anticommunism is regarded as a determinant of his patriotism.  He is often 
compared to Nazi conspirators like Stauffenberg or Oster who betrayed their 
state to try to save their country. Kukliński’s case was quite an important issue 
when Poland requested NATO membership. As a matter of fact, Kukliński was 
pardoned only two years before Poland joined NATO and seven years after 
communism collapsed. For obvious reasons, Kukliński is considered a hero, 
especially in America, and his case was even raised in the U.S. Senate in 1997, 
when Mr. Roth said, “Mr. President, I rise today to acknowledge the work of an 
unsung hero, a man whose unparalleled sense of duty to a free and democratic 
Poland contributed immeasurably not only to that country’s freedom from Soviet 
domination but also to the security of the United States. I refer to Col. Ryszard 
Kukliński.”150  
However, in Poland, Kukliński does not have as many supporters as in the 
U.S. and, as public surveys indicate Polish society is still divided regarding this 
issue. Among 47% citizens who are interested in this matter, 27% claim that his 
deeds were treason, 21% consider Kukliński as a patriot.151 
Opponents argue that he simply betrayed Poland, not Russia, because he 
was sending the CIA mainly Polish military secrets which, in the case of nuclear 
war, would have been used against all Warsaw Pact members. Moreover, based 
on today’s knowledge, there was not a real nuclear threat, at least not in the 
1970s. He also did not inform the anticommunism social movement Solidarity 
about plans for marshal law and purported Soviet intervention. Furthermore, he 
always acted on his own and never represented any other group of opponents. 
Kukliński was upset, especially by the fact that even key opposition members 
and Solidarity veterans did not show much understanding of his feat. Lech 
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Walesa, Solidarity founder and Polish President, did not recognize him as a 
patriot at the beginning of his presidency in 1990. Also, Adam Michnik, the left-
wing dissident and very active opposition member, did not see Kukliński as 
patriot. “It should not be forgotten, that Kukliński was in the army in March 1968 
during the anti-Semitism campaign and the brutal suppression of the opposition 
student movement; that he was in the army during the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia; and that he did not publicly condemn those actions, leave the 
army, leave the party, and somehow join the opposition.”152 
 
 
                                            




Today’s armed forces are entrenched in a very complex society where the 
diversity of tasks the soldiers may have to accomplish will cause many questions 
concerning the correctness of the received orders and their moral legitimacy.153 
Nevertheless, due to the fact that obedience is the highest military value, without 
which armed forces cannot exist, one should avoid such potential dilemmas for 
military professionals. That is why, based on the principles of military 
professionalism, the fundamentals of civil-military relations, particularly civilian 
supremacy over the armed forces, and historical facts, there is only one and 
clear conclusion to be drawn. All mentioned cases when soldiers thought it was 
their moral, professional and patriotic duty to act against political decisions and 
the orders of their civilian leaders, are rather an exception and should never 
serve as an example to be followed. Furthermore, many people compare 
Kukliński to German conspirators during World War II, but these examples were 
similar only to a certain extent. From a military professionalism perspective, 
Oster, Stauffenberg, and Kukliński betrayed their political leaders so they all are 
traitors. The difference is that German resistance to the Nazis is today crystal 
clear for the whole world and the fact that they were fighting against evil is 
unquestionable. What is more, by doing so, they did not weaken their country’s 
defense system but had tried to stop the war before it even occurred and then 
speed its end to enable Germany to take part in negotiations. 
However, after the July 20 plot, Stauffenberg, Oster and many others were 
not recognized as patriots, even by foreign societies. On August 1, 1944, the 
New York Herald Tribune reported: “If Hitlerism has begun its last stand by 
destroying the militarist tradition it has been doing a large part of the Allies’ work 
for them.”154 On August 9, the same newspaper continued the article to argue 
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that attempt to kill Hitler was “more reminiscent of the atmosphere of a gangster’s 
lurid underworld than of what one would normally expect within an officers’ corps 
and a civilized state.155 A few days after the plot, an academics and diplomat, 
English historian of German and diplomatic history, John Wheeler-Bennett wrote: 
“It may now be said with some definiteness that we are better off with things as 
they are today than if the plot of 20th July had succeeded and Hitler been 
assassinated… The Gestapo and the SS have done us an appreciable service in 
removing a selection of those who would undoubtedly have posed as ‘good’ 
Germans after the war… It is to our advantage therefore that the purge should 
continue, since the killing of Germans by Germans will save us from future 
embarrassments of many kinds.”156 
Today, streets in Germany are named after Hitler’s failed assassins, 
Wheeler-Bennett’s negative attitude towards German conspirators is considered 
inexcusable, and there is world wide understanding of those deeds. Although 
they undoubtedly violated all principles of military professionalism, and 
committed treason, the unambiguous history of Hitlerism and knowledge about 
the Nazis’ crimes, has allowed society to fully understand and glorify what they 
did. 
As a matter of fact, in the early 1950s, West Germany was asked to 
become the shield of western Europe against Communism and people who were 
involved in the July 20 Plot were among the most serious candidates for the new 
West German armed forces – Federal Defense Force - Bundeswehr. The 
commission, called the selection board, consisted of both former military and 
civilians and was established to carefully select personnel for the future German 
armed forces. The officers of Bundeswehr were to be politically neutral and also 
they had to fit the new democratic system. One of the members of the selection 
board, Fritz Erler, told parliament in 1954 that “the future force would not become 
the army of single political party or coalition; rather, it would assure that the future 
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personnel would be chosen not merely for their technical expertise but also 
according to their qualities of character as well as their unconditional reliability 
and loyalty to the democratic system.”157 Obviously, many former Wehrmacht 
officers as well as officers from all other branches volunteered to join 
Bundeswehr. The Acceptance Organization (PGA) had to carefully consider 
every application in order to avoid drafting former Nazis and others who had 
committed war crimes. The future officers were to be educated in a spirit of 
partnership and their military tradition was to be based mainly on the July 20 plot. 
The tradition dilemma was not solved whatsoever. The July 20 plot was a very 
hard psychological and moral problem and it was almost impossible to base both 
tradition and draft on only this event. Moreover, the main attempt to kill Hitler in 
July 1944, was not fully recognized in 1950s by German society as an act of 
patriotism and the highest devotion for the country. The founders of the 
Bundeswehr understood earlier than German society the moral and political 
aspect of conspirators and respected them as much as those who fought bravely 
and loyally at the front. Nevertheless, the July conspiracy against Hitler remained 
the main issue in judging candidates for new armed forces. The members of the 
selection board asked the future officers of their attitude to conspirators. The 
answers were supposed to help the commission decide who of the applicants 
was ready to serve in Bundeswehr.158  
In the summer of 1955, the first soldiers were drafted and the process of 
building Bundeswehr begun. Although tradition of new armed forces was mainly 
based on anti-Nazi resistance and the Prussian reformers from the beginning of 
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totally. The common soldiers of the Wehrmacht were also honorable because 
they fought with honor, loyalty, and great self-sacrifice. Since 1955, Bundeswehr 
has also grown its own tradition.159 
Selective approach to the history, especially the recent German military 
history, caused the Waffen-SS veterans public dissatisfaction. In response, the 
ministry spokesman explained that the Bundeswehr was not against the 
individual, not involved in crimes of Waffen-SS veterans, but against individuals 
who empathized with Nazis ideology.160    
Although, the Bundeswehr tradition was selected carefully, the problem 
with an adoption of the right German military history remained during the whole 
Cold War not fully solved.  The end of The Cold War did not bring any solution 
whatsoever, and the issue of the military heritage became even more 
complicated. Except of the experience of the Third Reich, the united Germany 
had to face the deep heritage of the fifty years of communism in the German 
Democratic Republic.  
The unification of Germany in 1990 brought the end of the second leading 
army of the Warsaw Pact; eastern German armed forces; the Nationale 
Volksarmee (NVA). For almost half a century, Bundeswehr was seen as an 
imperialistic enemy under the NATO compass and Nazi war flag, and its soldier 
was identified as a brutal, underhanded, and bloodthirsty foe.161 On the other 
hand, NVA was recognized as a strong Warsaw Pact ally and the great opponent 
to the democratic western Europe. After disbanding the NVA, the problem with its 
former soldiers and communist heritage was similar to the issue of former 
Wehrmacht soldiers after the war. During one night, the soldiers of former NVA 
became the citizens of the Federal Republic and the soldiers of Bundeswehr. 
However, only a small portion of these troops could continue their career in 
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Bundeswehr. As it had already happened before, there were a vast number of 
dissatisfied soldiers and officers who either had to retire or, due to the lack of non 
commission officers (NCO) corps in NVA command structures, serve with the 
lower rank. Although the service in former NVA was not condemned by the 
government of Federal Republic, the issues of patriotism, obedience, and loyalty 
were blurred again, especially in the eyes of the eastern German officers’.162  
The main difficulties concerning the unification laid in the differences 
between western and eastern soldierly mentalities and self-images. As one of the 
main figures of military unification General Jorg Schonbohm wrote in 1992, “the 
central problem after the takeover by the Bundeswehr of the NVA has been to 
promote a change in consciousness and establish the ideals of the citizen in 
uniform.”163 Almost four decades of the Cold War caused this clash about 
German military ideas. Nevertheless, there was one major common trait between 
the Bundeswehr and NVA. Both armies separated their customs, practices, and 
tradition from the rules of command, morale, and obedience in the Wehrmacht in 
National Socialism, the Reichswehr, and complicated pre-1918 German 
armies.164   
Due to the great afford from both sides, the integration process went 
relatively smoothly and appeared as an unexpected victory for the ideals of 
command and obedience in the new unified German armed forces.165 Some 
officers were retired and received the life-long pension; the others were 
reeducated and stayed in the Bundeswehr. In several cases the ranks of former 
NVA officers had to be reduced by one to two grades, very seldom by three 
grades. Even, those who had to carry on as NCOs were satisfied due to the 
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status, pay, respect, and high authority.166 The unification proved for the second 
time in German military history that military values such as obedience, loyalty, 
responsibility are unconditional and those who served proudly and loyally on 
either political side deserve the highest respect. “The career veterans of the NVA 
who carried on soldiers of the new Bundeswehr demonstrated an exemplary 
loyalty and expertise in the challenges of demobilization and reconstruction 
associated with the military in unification.”167 
From the dawn of history, all armed forces have used the examples of 
patriotic acts, victorious battles, and famous commanders to educate future 
officers, and to instill a sense of duty, and significance of military obedience in 
their minds. Polish armed forces also had problems with adoption of the proper 
heritage; the last fifty years were especially difficult in selecting the right tradition. 
The case of Col. Kukliński only complicated the perception and understanding of 
the Polish military tradition, and, different from German understanding of anti-
Nazi conspirators, it only blurred the meaning of obedience, loyalty, and 
patriotism.  
Military tradition has always been a significant element in shaping 
patriotism and strengthening cohesion of military units. Unfortunately, due to the 
fact that military is a tool of politics, tradition has always been shaped and 
carefully chosen to serve political purposes. That is why Polish armed forces had 
been inheriting different tradition during the time of political indoctrination 
between 1945-1989, than it inherits now. During the Cold War Polish armed 
forces, called at that time People’s Polish Army (LWP) was based only on 
specific tradition, which was selected carefully by the communists, and the 
historical facts were shaped to serve better the political purposes. During that 
time, the significance of the mutual Russian-Polish fight against Nazis was 
emphasized. At the same time, the historical facts like Russian intervention in 
                                            
166 Donald Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed, 33. 
167 Von Scheven, “Aufbau Ost,” Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik, October 3, 1995, cited 
in Donald Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed, 38. 
 73
September 17, 1939 or Polish-Russian war in 1920, and 123 years of Poland 
under the occupation where Russia was always one of the major occupants were 
forgotten.168  Russian communists were aware of importance of proper tradition, 
and its role in strengthening the Polish-Russian friendship. Therefore, right after 
WWII, the political body called Main Political-Educational Board of the People’s 
Polish Army was established. Its main task was political propaganda and 
education of Polish soldiers, especially officers in a spirit of belief in the rightness 
of Russian friendship. Between 1945-1989 Poland was not a fully sovereign state 
and was politically and economically dependent on the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless, the Polish military was popularly held to be the keeper of the 
Polish nation even at the lowest points of Warsaw’s communist regime.169    
The end of the Cold War and the change of political system in Poland in 
1989 have begun the process of returning to forgotten national tradition and to 
the one thousand year old history of Poland. Immediately after the collapse of 
communism, the People’s Republic of Poland was renamed the Republic of 
Poland, and the military oath was revised so the Polish soldiers did not have to 
pledge the loyalty to Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact. The 
white eagle of the Polish crest, the symbol of Poland as a republic and 
independent country, regained its crown.170  
The new military education system rejected political indoctrination, and 
adopted democratic ideology where the armed forces stay out of a politics, and 
professional soldiers must not be members of any political party. Democratic 
politicians claimed that the army as a tool of a state is supposed to serve loyally 
any political system, and as long as military officers had not committed any 
crimes, they were still trustworthy. As a matter of fact all military officers who 
served loyally during the communist time not only were allowed to stay in the 
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new democratic armed forces but also the lustration process did not apply to any 
of them. Probably, that was the reason why Col. Kukliński’s  sentence of 25 
years imprisoned was not changed till 1995 when political purposes provided him 
a pardon. Poland was applying for the membership in NATO, and the Polish 
colonel who was spying for the CIA, and at the same time informing NATO about 
the Warsaw Pact secret plans, simply could not be sentenced by the applicant to 
join this military organization. That political move was understood by the military, 
and although Col. Kukliński was not respected by most officers of that time, they 
did not object. Military officers knew that such an acquittal was necessary for 
Poland on its way to NATO. Nevertheless, when the extreme right-wing 
supporters wanted Col. Kukliński to become a national hero and two Polish cities, 
Krakow and Gdansk, awarded him an honorable citizenship, that brought up a 
wide discussion in Poland.  
Today, Poland is a member of NATO and European Union (EU); Col. 
Kukliński’s case is no longer an issue. He will probably remain forever a hero for 
some Poles and a traitor for the others, and nothing will change that attitude. 
However, as this thesis emphasized, military obedience, honor, and loyalty are 
the most important military values and only clear cases when it was necessary to 
have violated them can excuse such a behavior. German conspirators against 
Nazis are fully recognized today and nobody in Germany questions their deeds. 
Poland also has many great unquestionable heroes like Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, 
Gen. Jozef Haller or Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, but Col. Kukliński case is still too 
unclear to allow him to belong to the elite of national heroes, and serve as an 
example to be followed by the future Polish officers.              
Although Col. Kukliński’s case is not that easy to judge, it is similar, but 
only to a certain extent, to that of Stauffenberg and Oster. Kukliński betrayed the 
system he was supposed to serve, so he committed treason and automatically is 
a traitor. First and foremost, not many Polish citizens, contrary to the Germans’ 
recognition of World War II conspirators, recognize him as a hero. Only 21% of 
citizens are convinced about his patriotism and the others, either do not have any 
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opinion or consider his act as treason. Secondly, also in deep contrast to Hitler’s 
traitors’ case, the history of communism in Poland, particularly marshal law and 
its legitimacy, is still not clear. Although, there have already been many attempts 
to know if there really was a Russian intervention threat, and if marshal law was 
an indispensable means of preventing Soviet involvement, a clear answer does 
not exist. What is more, Poland today is a democratic country, where civilian 
control over the armed forces and political wisdom must be respected by all 
military personnel, and there cannot be any doubts concerning obedience. 
Forty years ago, Poland, as a Warsaw Pact member, sent its troops to 
Czechoslovakia to suppress revolution. That was actually the turning point for 
Kukliński. Today, Poland, as a NATO member and close American ally sends its 
troops to Iraq and Afghanistan although the majority of Polish citizens argue that 
it is wrong.171 Supposedly, among these people who are against Polish 
involvement in the Middle East, there are some military officers. They, 
considering themselves as patriots, who cannot inactively watch how Polish 
soldiers are dying hundreds miles from home, could turn in many different ways, 
against a “wrong” political decision. The army, then, would become useless and 
would endanger the principles of both military professionalism and democracy.  
That is why, as long as the Kukliński case is not as clear as the 
Stauffenberg and Oster examples, it cannot be considered as heroism. He was 
pardoned for a clear political reason, because “war is simply a continuation of 
political intercourse, with the addition of other means,”172 and the military must 
serve political goals.  
Regardless of Kukliński’s intention, every soldier’s responsibility, as it is 
stated in the second and third chapters, is directed toward his comrades and his 
society and not toward anything else. Although Kukliński might have thought that 
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by spying, he would serve his country best, he could not be sure about it. The 
good Colonel violated all principles of military professionalism and, which should 
rather be the subject of a further thesis in ethics and moral philosophy, 
presumably all principles of humanistic ethics. In the end, treason can never be 
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